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Executive Summary 
This report provides a preliminary quantitative analysis of the financial results of five 
organizations which are clients of FondoMicro. It also includes a qualitative assessment of the 
long-run vision held by these institutions' managers and of the organizations' ability to allow a 
transformation into self-sustainable institutions, whose financial contracts are useful to small and 
micro entrepreneurs. 
The five organizations studied are ADEMI (Asociaci6n para el Desarrollo de Microempre-
sas, Inc.), ADEPE (Asociaci6n para el Desarrollo de la Provincia Espaillat, Inc.), ADOPEM 
(Asociaci6n Dominicana para el Desarrollo de la Mujer), FONDESA (Fondo Para el Desarrollo, 
Inc.), and the Candelaria Credit Cooperative (Cooperativa Nuestra Senora de la Candelaria, Inc.). 
Overall preliminary financial results for these five lenders show a positive trend. Except 
for ADOPEM in 1992 (to a minor extent) and FONDESA during 1992 and 1993, all have been 
profitable in accounting terms. In addition, a measure of subsidy dependency suggests that 
ADEMI could be profitable even if it had to pay market rates of interest for its funds. This is the 
case of Cooperativa Candelaria, which operates entirely on market terms. 
These lending organizations do not, to any great degree, use funds subsidized by donors 
in order to leverage funds from non-donor sources. Funds borrowed from commercial banks do 
not make up a significant portion of any of these lenders' liabilities (i.e., they are not used to fund 
their portfolio). Moreover, only ADEMI and Cooperativa Candelaria accept deposits (or deposit 
equivalents). 
By current standards for microfmance institutions, all of these lenders (except FONDESA 
in the past) run relatively efficient operations. That is, they do not seem to use excessive resources 
to produce their financial services, although there is still room for improvement. 
Cooperativa Candelaria and the other AIRAC cooperatives (Asociaci6n de Instituciones 
Rurales de Ahorro y Credito), upgraded by the earlier Ohio State University's Rural Financial 
Services Project, are already self-sustainable and operate as full fmancial intermediaries, with no 
donor funds. ADEMI would be self-sustainable, if donors would force the issue. ADOPEM is a 
few steps away from self-sustainability, and the difficulties remaining are not insurmountable. 
ADEPE's lending program, in tum, could eventually become independent of subsidies, 
but it will have to get much bigger and its parent institution will have to adopt the same hard-
nosed philosophy as the lending program. Cross-subsidization from the lending program to other 
activities will have to be avoided. FONDESA has the desire and the vision to be self-sustainable, 
but its small size and the staggering losses from the past that had to be absorbed in the last two 
years make realization of such potential less certain. 
iii 
FondoMicro's funds and technical assistance have been instrumental in bringing the 
Dominican market for microfmance to its present state, although ADEMI preceded its operations. 
FondoMicro prodded those lenders whose portfolios reeked with delinquent loans from past years 
into painful but healthy sanitizations. By basing the maintenance and/or expansion of its lines of 
credit on financial results and on loan recuperation, FondoMicro has motivated its clients to pay 
more attention to aspects of lending that matter for self-sustainability. Funds and technical 
assistance from FondoMicro should continue to be contingent on steady progress of its clients 
toward self-sustainability. 
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: ANALYSIS OF THE CLIENTS OF FONDOMICR01 
by 
Mark Schreiner and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Purpose 
This study examines five clients of FondoMicro in three areas. 
1. The analysis of the lenders' fmancial results indicates the impact of the provision 
of fmancial services on the institution. This analysis should facilitate identification 
of the changes to existing policies, procedures, or levels of resources that will lead 
to self-sustainability. 
2. The analysis of the lenders' outreach results suggests the impact of the provision 
of financial services on people. This matters because FondoMicro and its client 
organizations are supported by donors for whom fmancial self-sustainability is not 
an end in itself, but rather a means to the end of long-run improvement in people's 
standards of living. 
1 Report prepared for the USAID Mission in the Dominican Republic. The authors were in 
Santo Domingo from February 27 to March 11 (Schreiner) and from March 7 to March 12 
(Gonzalez-Vega), for a rapid assessment of the country's microfinance sector. They were 
accompanied by Richard Rosenberg. 
2 The authors are Graduate Research Associate and Professor of Agricultural Economics, 
respectively, at The Ohio State University. They are particularly grateful to Richard Rosenberg 
(AID's Economic Growth Center), who accompanied them to Santo Domingo, and with Douglas 
Ball, Mario Davalos, Andres Dauhajre, Pedro Jimenez, Camilo Lluberes, Mercedes de Canalda, 
Mike Deal,Larry Laird, Efrain Laureano, Luis Gonzalez, Virginio Gerardo, Mercedes de Beiss-
Goico, Ramiro Tejada, Adalgisa Adams, Luis Mosquera, Eduardo Latorre, Dorea Barcacel, 
Cristian Reyna, Jorge Quilvio, and many other representatives of the organizations visited as well 
as knowledgeable friends in the Dominican Republic who shared their views with the authors. 
This rapid assessment is preliminary and inevitably contains important errors and omission. The 
authors assume full responsibility for these shortcomings and for the opinions expressed, not 
necessarily shared by the sponsoring organizations. They hope, however, that the implicit 
recommendations will be helpful in providing better financial services to the Dominican poor. 
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3. The analysis of the lenders' development over time indicates whether gambling 
(investing) more resources on these institutions is likely to pay off in the future. 
Examination of past trends in financial results and of the managers' qualitative 
vision for their organizations' future may serve to guide allocations of donor 
assistance. 
B. Methodology 
The financial analysis includes three areas: 
1. Accounting profitability: 
Financial statements from clients of FondoMicro show if actual income exceeds 
expenses. 
2. Commercial profitability: 
Adjusted financial statements from clients of FondoMicro, in conjunction with sha-
dow prices assigned to various subsidized resources, produce an index of subsidy 
dependency which indicates the direction and size of the changes necessary, were 
the lender to pay commercial prices for all its resources and break even. 
3. Leverage of donor resources: 
Donors want present investments to increase the future supply of resources at the 
service of microfinance. A donor leverage index summarizes the amount of 
resources (outstanding portfolio) that an institution generates for each unit of 
subsidized resources (liabilities and capital) used. 
The analysis of outreach includes two areas: 
1. Characteristics of loans 
A loan contract is characterized by its terms and conditions. Contractual dimen-
sions such as loan size, repayment schedule, real effective interest rate, and month-
ly payment determine which people find borrowing to be welfare-improving. 
2. Characteristics of borrowers 
The impact of identical loan contracts varies by type of borrower. Donors have different 
expectations for an institution's progress toward self-sustainability if its services are used 
by a (difficult) segment of the population the donor wishes to target. 
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The analysis of lender development includes three areas: 
1. Financial trends 
Experience suggests that successful microenterprise finance institutions pass through a 
period of exponential growth which enables them to capture economies of scale and to 
reach significant numbers of borrowers. Analysis of financial statements can reveal 
whether the lender is entering, leaving, or within the transformation phase. 
2. Operational Efficiency 
In addition to interest rate policies that do not generate sufficient earnings from lending 
to cover costs, lack of self-sustainability usually stems from operational inefficiencies, 
which may be battled on two fronts. The first is through clientele growth and economies 
of scale; the second is through time and economies of learning. 
3. Institutional Vision 
The metamorphosis from a subsidy-dependent non-government lending organization 
(NGO) to a self-sufficient financial intermediary requires vision and desire from the 
management as well as flexibility from the institutional structure. Qualitative analysis can 
indicate whether the lender plans to make the transformation and whether the 
organization's ground rules can even allow it. 
C. Data 
The preliminary quantitative analysis presented here is based on fmancial data collected 
from the clients of FondoMicro and from FondoMicro itself. All figures have been adjusted in 
accordance with the guidelines for the analysis of microenterprise finance institutions published 
by the lnterAmerican Development Bank (1994). Except for where specific units are indicated, 
all figures are in thousands of real 1992 Dominican pesos. 3 
There were numerous holes and inconsistencies in the original data sources. The figures 
presented here are therefore best viewed as simply indicators of trends, directions, and magni-
tudes, best useful for seeing broad patterns. Appendices I and IT detail the derivation of the figures 
presented in this report and identify their limitations. The qualitative analysis is based on inter-
views with the personnel of the lenders and with FondoMicro officers, as well as on reviews of 
documents provided by USAID and the lending organizations. 
3 When the symbol DR$ is used, figures are nominal, in pesos of current value. When no 
symbol is used, figures are in thousands and have been deflated by the Consumer Price Index, to 
represent thousands of pesos of constant purchasing power at 1992 prices. 
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H. ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL RESULTS 
A. Accounting Profitability 
Accounting profit, also called net income, is the excess of income over expenses in a 
period. Return on assets (ROA) is a measure of net income that controls for the level of resources 
required to produce that profit. For example, ADEMI's 1994 net income of 23,371 and average 
annual assets of 185,251 produced a ROA of 13 percent. 
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Figure 1. Return on Assets for four NGOs (1992-1994). 
Note: Figures are shown in Table 1.2. 
Data for Cooperativa Candelaria were not collected. 
Figure 1 graphs ROA for 1992-94 for the four NGOs. It illustrates that ADEM!, ADEPE, 
ADOPEM, and FONDESA had positive accounting profits and thus positive ROA by 1994 (or 
even before). Indeed, FONDESA became profitable only that year. Cooperativa Candelaria is ex-
cluded from the graph, due to lack of data, but most ( if not all) credit cooperatives associated 
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with AIRAC have been profitable. 4 Since 1992, ADEMI's ROA has decreased from 20 to 13 
percent; ADOPEM has raised its ROA from -1 to 6 percent. FONDESA had an ROA of -4 
percent in 1993, but this organization became profitable in 1994.5 
Positive accounting profit is a significant achievement for a rnicrofinance institution. 
Precious few of the thousands of rnicrofmance institutions perform at this level. All of the clients 
of FondoMicro were generating retained earnings and increasing the amount of resources available 
for rnicrofmance over time. For the time being, the organizations are growing and are able to meet 
their financial obligations. 
B. Commercial Profitability 
There are two reasons why accounting profit does not imply long-run self-sustainability. 
First, inflation erodes the value of the equity base and, therefore, even an institution that shows 
an accounting profit will see its equity base shrink, until the organization collapses, if profits are 
not plowed back at a rate higher than inflation. 
Second, subsidies are a form of quasi-equity whose real value must be maintained. All 
clients of FondoMicro, except for the AIRAC cooperatives, receive large subsidies, both via 
FondoMicro loans at lower-than-market interest rates as well as from other sources. In the long 
run, these subsidies will dry up and disappear. Thus, long-run self-sustainability requires that 
lenders generate profits in order to accumulate sufficient retained earnings to replace subsidies in 
the future. 
A microfinance institution is commercially profitable if it earns a return so high that it 
could pay the going rate of return for capital from private investors for its equity and subsidies 
(quasi-equity) and still show an accounting profit. One indicator of commercial profitability is 
Yaron's (1992b) Subsidy Dependency Index (SDI). The SDI indicates the percentage change, 
holding everything else constant, in the average rate of return on the loan portfolio that would 
enable the lender to pay commercial prices for its equity and liabilities and operate without 
subsidies. 
4 All credit cooperatives associated with AIRAC have good data and accounting records. The 
authors simply did not have time to visit the cooperative and collect the information. Rather, some 
data were obtained from FondoMicro, because this is one of two cooperatives which borrowed 
from FondoMicro. 
5 Return on performing assets measures profitability more accurately than does ROA, but the 
organizations examined here generally have such low levels of non-performing assets that the 
directions and the magnitudes of the results are not affected by simply including all assets in the 
calculation. 
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Thus, an SDI equal to one (100 percent) would mean that interest rates must be doubled 
in order to break even. This may not be enough. Clearly, a lending organization should generate 
more than zero profits if it wants to grow and protect itself from unexpected negative shocks. In 
turn, a negative SDI is desirable, because it connotes commercial profitability; the lender could 
earn less on its portfolio, pay commercial rates for its liabilities and capital, and still show an 
accounting profit. A positive SDI indicates, instead, that commercial profitability would require 
a higher rate of return on the portfolio than that being earned . 
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Figure 2. Subsidy Dependency Index for Three NGOs (1992-1994). 
Figure 2 plots the SDI for three clients of FondoMicro for 1992 to 1994. The details of 
the calculations appear in Appendix IT. ADEMI was more than commercially profitable for 1992-
1994, as indicated by its negative SDI. However, ADEMI's SDI became less negative, as its level 
of commercial profitability declined over time. The change in ADEMI's SDI probably has not 
resulted from reduced operational efficiency, but rather from its foray into small business lending, 
with funds heavily subsidized by the European Development Bank. In addition, by doubling its 
equity in the three-year period, ADEMI doubled its implicit cost of equity. In general the SDI will 
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increase if actual profits do not grow as fast as equity. In any case, its SDI understates ADEMI's 
impressive strength, reflected by other indicators. 
Cooperativa Candelaria was also commercially profitable. This cooperative operates on 
market terms and essentially uses no donor-generated resources. It is totally free from subsidy 
dependency. Thus, among the lenders studied, the least dependent on subsidies is Cooperativa 
Candelaria. This success probably results largely from the cooperative's basic philosophy, shared 
with all of the affiliates of AIRAC, that mere existence depends on commercial profitability. 
Growth is expected to come from within, and management is freed to direct the institution to earn 
profits rather than to cater to the whims of donors. Cooperativa Candelaria did receive about 
DR$8,000 in subsidies in 1993, and it borrowed about DR$33,000 from FondoMicro.6 Both 
figures are by far the smallest for any of the lenders studied here. 
The SDI reveals that ADOPEM and FONDESA, although profitable in accounting terms, 
by 1994, are not profitable in commercial terms. From 1992 to 1994, ADOPEM would have had 
to charge a rate of interest about 33 percent higher on its loans in order to be commercially 
profitable (e.g., about four rather than three percent and about 3.3 instead of 2.5 percent per 
month on its loans). Although FONDESA experienced an important improvement in commercial 
profitability in 1994, it would still have to increase its interest rates to become independent of 
subsidies (i.e., charge about 48 rather than 40 percent per year). 
Thus, ADOPEM is not yet commercially profitable. In fact, its SDI slightly worsened even 
as its accounting profits grew. There are several possible explanations of this trend: 
1. ADOPEM may be less efficient than is possible; 
2. ADOPEM has grown explosively since 1992. That growth, however, may not have 
generated sufficient economies of scale, or it may have created costs of learning and of 
adjustment that have yet to be overcome; 
3. ADOPEM makes more (a greater number of) and smaller loans than do the other lenders. 
This raises its costs relative to the others, because a large part of the costs of lending are 
invariant to the size of the loans; 
4. The small size of ADOPEM's loans and the fact that the loans are exclusively for women 
may enable ADOPEM to woo potential donors more easily than otherwise, reducing 
external pressures to grow out of subsidies. 
5. Most likely, its lack of commercial profitability reflects that ADOPEM charges slightly 
lower effective interest rates than the other three NGOs, despite its higher average costs 
6 All values in this report are measured in thousands of 1992 pesos of constant purchasing 
power, except when the symbol DR$ is used, which designates nominal values (current pesos). 
The loan from FondoMicro is equivalent to US$2,568. 
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of lending. Commercial profitability could therefore most likely be achieved by revising 
its interest rate policies. 
In turn, FONDESA's commercial profitability appears to have improved dramatically in 
1994, although the organization is still subsidy dependent. This result can be traced in part to 
improvements in operational efficiency, despite FONDESA's small size and lack of economies 
of scale. In addition, in 1993 and 1994, FONDESA sanitized its portfolio, writing off about 
DR$1.2 million in bad loans that should have been written off long before. FONDESA's high SDI 
reflects in part the short-term ill effects of this long-term medicine. 
Although profitable in accounting terms, ADEPE's lending operation is not commercially 
profitable. This is reflected by a very high SDI, which suggests the need to almost double interest 
rates. Moreover, ADEPE dabbles in much more than just lending. Among other things, it operates 
a hog and poultry farm, a watershed reforestation project, a rural solar electrification project, and 
a processor of animal feed. These activities are not always profitable. The hog and poultry farm, 
intended to generate surpluses to cross-subsidize other projects, has in fact shown deficits and has 
been subsidized by ADEPE's lending arm. 
Furthermore, a large part of ADEPE's accounting profit derives from grants, and this 
generates a high subsidy dependence. The long-run viability of ADEPE's lending program 
depends on the institution's ability to confer discipline on its other children, or to run its lending 
program as an entirely separate entity, charging interest rates that cover all (explicit and implicit) 
costs. That is, it must generate sufficient profits to reduce its subsidy dependency. 
C. Leverage of Donor Resources 
Donors want microfinance institutions to use donor resources to facilitate capturing funds 
from the public and from commercial sources, thus multiplying the effects of the donors' invest-
ment (Rosenberg). The Donor Leverage Ratio (DLR) is the amount of assets (portfolio) controlled 
by a microfmance institution (less capitalized earnings from previous periods), divided by the 
amount of subsidized donor liabilities used in that period. The DLR increases as the institution 
funds its activities more with deposits, retained earnings, and commercial loans. A higher DLR 
would typically indicate a higher return to a donor's investment, but interpretation of this rough 
indicator must be cautious. See Appendix I for more details about the derivation of the DLR in 
this report. 
The DLR divides the lenders studied here into three groups. The first group contains 
Cooperativa Candelaria. For each peso of liabilities subsidized by donors, the cooperative 
generated over 100 pesos in assets. Note, however, the lack of cause and effect; the subsidized 
funds were not the enabling factor in attracting non-subsidized funding. Rather, what mattered was 
the cooperative's intrinsic safety and soundness and its basic philosophy of funding itself through 
retained earnings, membership fees, and voluntary deposits. The DLR is not very meaningful in 
this case. 
9 
The second group contains ADEMI. For each peso of subsidized liabilities from donors, 
ADEMI generated about 1.5 to two pesos in assets. These non-subsidized funds have had three 
sources: 
1. A line of credit with Banco Popular. 
This line of credit is used sparingly and represents less than one percent of the organiza-
tion's liabilities. It functions chiefly as a source of cash, should ADEMI's "depositors" 
decide to withdraw their funds en masse. 
2. Loans from micro and small entrepreneurs. 
These are deposits, guised to avoid laws against deposit-taking by non-regulated institu-
tions. They represent about 17 percent of AD EMI' s liabilities. 
3. Retained earnings. 
Almost half of ADEMI's assets (43 percent in 1994) are funded with retained earnings, 
and more than 20 million (pesos of 1992) have been added each year to its equity. 
As noted in the discussion of the SDI, ADEMI could afford to pay commercial prices for 
all its funds. It does not, however, take advantage of its creditworthiness to borrow on the market, 
and it would be foolish from its perspective to do so, when it can continue to build its equity base 
with the aid of cheap donor funds. Donors cannot expect a lender to leverage donor funds when 
the donors themselves are willing to provide almost all the funds the lender wants. 
FondoMicro plans to reduce lending to ADEMI until this organization represents 50 
percent or less of the portfolio of FondoMicro. This implies reducing ADEMI's line of credit 
from about DR$54.6 million to about DR$34.1 million.7 Because ADEMI is strong and because 
FondoMicro funds are already priced at 80 percent of prime, ADEMI should have no trouble re-
placing these funds from commercial sources, should it choose to do so. 
The third group contains ADEPE, ADOPEM, and FONDESA. From 1992 to 1994, this 
group generated about one peso of assets for each peso of subsidized liabilities from donors. Any 
leverage of donor funds occurred via the generation of retained earnings, because of the three, 
only ADOPEM holds (forced) deposits and none borrows commercially. 8 
7 From US$4.2 million to US$2.7 million 
8 ADOPEM does have a loan at commercial prices that is not backed by donor guarantees, but 
it is a mortgage on their locale. Forced deposits are not a genuine market tool to mobilize funds. 
They reduce subsidy dependency only because when they are used as compensating balances on 
10 
Subsidies from donors for members of this third group, therefore, have not yet led to 
increasing use of non-subsidized funds. Whereas Cooperativa Candelaria has been weaned and 
ADEMI is ready to be weaned, ADEPE, ADOPEM, and FONDESA are not yet profitable enough 
to nourish themselves with more expensive, and more substantive, commercial funds. The 
question for donor strategy is how to increase the fledglings' strength and whether the required 
investment is worth it. 
III. ANALYSIS OF OUTREACH 
A. Characteristics of Loans 
The single most important characteristic of a loan contract from the borrower's perspective 
is the matching of the average monthly payment to the borrower's pattern of cash flow. In turn, 
the average monthly payment depends on the initial loan amount, the repayment term, the nominal 
interest rate, and any fees or obligatory deposits. Table 1 presents these elements for the lenders 
under examination. 
The lowest average loan amounts belong to ADOPEM at DR$4,381 and to Cooperativa 
Candelaria at DR$9,683.9 These lenders also show the smallest minimum size loans. These figures 
fall out from their client's repayment capacity. ADOPEM, for example, targets women 
microentrepreneurs. The cooperatives do not target their loans, however, but it turns out that they 
often lend to teachers and other workers with regular but relatively low salaries, for consumer 
expenditures such as housing improvements. 
The highest average loan amounts belong to ADEMI (at DR$22,396), FONDESA (at 
DR$20,881), and ADEPE (at DR$15,394). 10 Again, these figures reflect the specific clientele of 
each lender. ADEMI lends for microenterprises and not for consumer expenditures. ADEMI is 
also expanding its lending to small businesses, which partly explains the increase in its average 
initial loan amount from DR$12,303 in 1992 to DR$18,474 in 1993 and to DR$22,396 in 1994. 
Loans to small businesses also account for ADEMI's showing the largest maximum loan at 
DR$950,000 and the largest maximum term at 60 months. 
a loan, the effective rate of interest increases. 
9 At the exchange rate of DR$12.85 per US dollar, these amounts are, respectively, about 
US$341 and US$754. 
1° For micro loans, ADEMI's average loan is DR$17,430 (equivalent to US$1,356). 
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The relatively large average loans of FONDESA and ADEPE reflect their focus on lending 
to manufacturing enterprises, often for small durable producer goods such as electrical generators. 
For all five lenders, the most common loan term is a year or less (8 to 12 months). 
The nominal monthly interest rate charged over the initial loan amount ranges from about 
2.5 percent for ADEM!, ADEPE, and ADOPEM to 3.3 percent for FONDESA, and 4.0 percent 
for Cooperativa Candelaria. 11 Although Cooperativa Candelaria has the highest nominal monthly 
interest rate, it has the lowest real effective monthly rate, because the other lenders deduct larger 
fees from the initial loan amount up front and/or require obligatory deposits. It turns out that the 
real effective monthly interest rate from Cooperativa Candelaria is about 2. 9 percent, whereas for 
ADEMI, ADEPE, and ADOPEM it is about 4.4 percent. The highest real effective monthly rate 
(6.3 percent) belongs to FONDESA, which charges both the second-highest nominal monthly 
interest rate and the highest loan fee. 
Finally, the average monthly payment follows the pattern of the average initial balance. 
ADEMI, FONDESA, and ADEPE, the lenders with the greatest focus on small and manufacturing 
enterprises, have the largest monthly payments. Their clients have enterprises which can use 
larger loans and which can produce cash flows that can support larger monthly payments. 
ADOPEM and Cooperativa Candelaria, the lenders whose clients have smaller cash flows, make 
smaller loans which require smaller monthly payments. 
11 This discussion pertains only to each lender's loan package that is in the microenterprise 
range. The terms of some loans from some of the lenders depend on the size of the loan and/or 
the supposed source of the funds lent. The figures used here are representative for the average 
loan under DR$30,000 for these lenders. For more details, see Appendix IT. 
Table l. All lenders: Loan Conditions, 1994. 
ADEMI ADEPE ADOPEM 
Average loan amount (current pesos) 17,430 15,394 4,381 
Maximum 950,000 80,000 200,000 
Minimum 500 N/A 400 
Average loan term (months) 10 8 12 
Maximum 60 12 24 
Minimum 1 6 8 
Debt service load 
Average outstanding balance (current pesos )b 8,715 7,697 2,191 
Monthly nominal interest rate (% )C 2.5 2.7 2.5 
Loan fees (% t 6.0 4.0 2.0 
Obligatory deposit (% )c 0.0 0.0 8.0 
Real effective monthly interest rate (% )d 4.4 4.4 4.2 
Average monthly payment (current pesos)e 2,179 2,335 475 
Figures for Candelaria and for FONDESA are for 1993. Notes: a 
b 
c 
Expected average outstanding balance computed as one-half of the initial loan size. 
Interest, fees and compensating deposits computed as a percentage of initial loan size. 
Candelariaa FONDESAa 
9,683 20,881 
200,000 350,000 
500 2,500 
N/A 12 
N/A 24 
N/A 4 
4,842 10,441 
4.0 3.3 
1.0 8.0 
N/C 0.0 
2.9 6.3 
1,190 2,436 ' 
d The calculation of the real effective interest rate and average monthly payment for Candelaria assumes a 12-month loan 
and no compensating balances. The calculations for ADEMI are for its micro loans only. The average ADEMI loan 
amount including small loans is DR$22,396. 
e Including amortization and interest payments. Equal installments over the average term to maturity are assumed. 
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B. Characteristics of Borrowers 
Table 2 details the proportions of the total number of loans granted to a given classification 
of borrower as well as the proportions of the total amount loaned going to that classification. Cells 
are empty when the relevant data were not available. Cooperativa Candelaria is omitted from the 
table because the data was not collected by the authors. 
ADOPEM lends exclusively to women, ADEPE lends mostly to men, and ADEMI and 
FONDESA divide their portfolios more evenly between men and women. ADOPEM's vocation 
is lending to women, whereas the male-dominance reflected in ADEPE's portfolio may in part 
reflect its focus on agriculture and manufacturing. 
The sectoral distribution of ADEMI's loans reflects lack of targeting based on factors not 
related to repayment capacity. Trade (or commerce) accounts for 44 percent of the portfolio, 
manufacturing for 34 percent, and services for the remaining 22 percent. For FONDESA, 
targeting of the manufacturing sector stands out, with 76 percent of the portfolio in that sector, 
17 percent in trade, and 11 percent in services. 
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Table 2. All lenders: Borrower Characteristics (percentages), 1994. 
ADEMI ADEPE ADOPEM FONDESA 
GENDER NQ. LQ!Hl~ Women 43 13 100 
Men 57 87 0 
AmQ.unt LQan~d Women 100 46 
Men 0 54 
ACTIVITY NQ. LQan~ Manufacturing 34 72 
Commerce 44 17 
Trade 22 11 
AmQu:gt LQan~d Manufacturing 37 76 
Commerce 45 13 
Service 18 11 
LOCATION NQ. LQans Urban 100 69 90 100 
Rural 0 31 10 0 
AmQunt LQaned Urban 100 100 
Rural 0 0 
METHOD NQ. LQan~ Individual 100 a b 95 
Group 0 5 
AmQ.Ynt LQan~d Individual 100 
Group 0 
TYPE NQ. LQan~ Micro 99 100 91 
Small 1 0 9 
Amm.mt LQan~d Micro 100 
Small 0 
Notes: Blanks designate instances where data are not available. 
b 
ADEPE has stopped making loans to groups. Some loans to groups are still outstanding 
from the past, but data were not available to make the distinction. 
ADOPEM lends to groups, but a breakdown was not available. The vast majority of the 
amounts in its portfolio go to individual borrowers. 
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The lender's clients are overwhelmingly urban. Only ADEPE, with 30 percent of its loans 
in agriculture, has a significant rural presence, and even ADEPE is trying to shift its portfolio 
away from agriculture, because its urban portfolio has a better repayment record and generates 
more profits. 
The loans are, except for small parts of the portfolios of FONDESA and ADOPEM, dis-
bursed to individuals rather than to groups. ADEPE lent to groups in the past, but it does not any-
more. As discussed in Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994), this shift is likely to have positive effects 
both on borrower welfare and on the ability of lenders to learn and to increase efficiency over 
time. 
Finally, most loans are disbursed to micro businesses rather than to small businesses. The 
fact that a small business usually borrows larger amounts than a micro business means, however, 
that these relatively few loans account for a relatively large share of the amount of pesos lent. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF LENDER DEVELOPMENT 
A. Financial Trends 
Financial progress over time can be viewed through the growth of various categories of 
the balance sheet (assets, liabilities, and equity) and measures of profitability (ROA and SDI). 
This section concentrates on the balance sheet, profitability having been discussed earlier. The ap-
pendices contain balance sheets for all the lending organizations studied, from 1992 to 1994, and 
Table 3 shows the annual real growth rates of assets, liabilities, and equity for the four NGO lend-
ers. Sufficient data for Cooperativa Candelaria were not collected. This prevents a trend analysis, 
but such analysis is less relevant in this case, because of the cooperative's history of slow, con-
trolled growth, its commercial profitability, and its independence from donor subsidies. 
16 
Table 3. AU Lenders: Annual Growth Rates of Assets, Liabilities, and Equity (per-
centages) 1992-1994 
' 
. I Lender Annual Growth I 1992 I 1993 I 1994 I Rate 
ADEMI Assets 65 54 20 
Liabilities 69 58 17 
Equity 61 49 23 
ADEPP Assets 2 -1 27 
Liabilities 14 03 12 
Equity -16 -9 62 
ADOPEM Assets 77 104 30 
Liabilities 149 128 25 
Equity -3 33 54 
FONDESA Assets 41 14 15 
Liabilities 29 19 22 
Equity 101 0 -14 
a Refers to ADEPE's total operation. 
ADEMI seems to be emerging from a period of extremely rapid growth and entering a 
stage of steady growth. Growth of assets, for example, stood at 65 percent in 1992, 54 percent 
in 1993, and 20 percent in 1994. Liabilities and equity followed the same pattern. ADEMI seems 
to have already taken advantage of many of the economies of scale available from growth, and 
it has also been around long enough to perfect its lending and administrative technologies. Further 
growth will probably continue, albeit at a pace resembling more that of 1994 than that of 1992, 
with ADEMI expanding branches outside of Santo Domingo and opening new branches, and with 
an increasing prominence of relatively large loans to small businesses. 
The total activities of ADEPE grew spectacularly in 1994, compared to its past perform-
ance, due to a large donation for a reforestation project. Its lending operation has grown slowly, 
however. Although ADEPE is certainly learning to run a commercially profitable lending 
operation, its very small absolute size makes it seem unlikely that growth will complement this 
learning enough to push ADEPE over the hump towards long-term self-sustainability in the near 
future. Further, the administration must divide its time and energy between lending and others 
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projects, reducing its efficiency. Future growth will likely stem from a movement of the portfolio 
out of agriculture and into the more profitable urban enterprise sector. 
ADOPEM grew even more rapidly than ADEMI during 1992 and 1993, before showing 
a similar slowdown in 1994. It should be noted, however, that ADOPEM's growth of assets of 
77 percent in 1992, 104 percent in 1993, and 30 percent in 1994 occurred over a substantially 
smaller absolute base than did ADEMI's growth of assets. For example, ADEMI's asset growth 
rate of 54 percent in 1993 represented an increase in the absolute level of assets of DR$59.4 
million, whereas ADOPEM's asset growth rate of 104 percent corresponded to an absolute growth 
of DR$10.9 million. 
ADOPEM' s average loan size is about one-fifth that of ADEMI, and it appears that the 
growth of this organization has resulted more from increasing the number of loans rather than 
from increasing their size. It seems that ADOPEM has learned the state-of-the-art in lending 
technology, and that its lack of commercial profitability probably stems mostly from the inherently 
less-profitable nature of small loans. Although improved profitability may likely result more from 
increasing the size of loans to repeat borrowers than from increasing the number of loans to new 
borrowers, it seems inevitable that ADOPEM will have to raise interest rates to cover the costs 
of serving a more difficult clientele. 
FONDESA has seen declining growth. In 1992, assets grew 41 percent, liabilities grew 
29 percent, and equity grew 101 percent. In 1993, however, assets grew 14 percent, liabilities 
grew 19 percent, and equity grew 22 percent. Equity decreased in 1994, by 14 percent. This 
reflected major write-offs of bad debt. This unfavorable figure is thus partly the short-term effect 
on long-term structural changes FONDESA is making, as it consciously attempts to learn sound 
lending practices and as it pays for its unsound policies of the past. It is uncertain, however, 
whether and/or when the changes will lead to the sustained growth that can take advantage of 
complementary economies of scale. 
B. Operational Efficiency 
Efficiency refers to producing a given amount of output as cheaply as it is technically 
possible. Taking ADEMI as a standard, because of its profitability and maturity in both size and 
learning, ADEPE and ADOPEM seem to be operating fairly efficiently, given the dimensions of 
their organizations and the size of their loans. FONDESA lags behind. Data limitations preclude 
conclusions concerning the efficiency of Cooperativa Candelaria, but all indications suggest highly 
efficient operations. 
Table 4 shows that ADEMI and ADEPE, despite gross differences in their overall size, 
have remarkably comparable measures of operational efficiency. For example, each one has a 
ratio of loan officers to total staff of about 0.55. Although ADEMI dwarfs ADEPE, its size has 
not led to a higher ratio of field workers to office workers. This can probably be attributed to 
ADEMI's strategy of horizontal expansion, through relatively autonomous branches. Each branch 
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has a relatively fixed overhead of managers, accountants, and secretaries, and the economies of 
scale available from growth result mostly from better occupation of the staff of the central office 
rather than from fuller use of the staff of the branches. 
ADEPE has no branches and certainly no economies of scale to speak of, and yet the 
average number of loans managed by a loan officer is higher for ADEPE (163) than for ADEMI 
(123). Although ADEMI's loan officers handle a higher average portfolio (DR$1 ,768,000) than 
do ADEPE's loan officers (DR$1,569,000), the difference is surprisingly small, given their 
relative size as organizations and that ADEMI makes larger loans than does ADEPE. 
One widely recognized benchmark for operational efficiency is that each loan officer 
manage a portfolio with at least 100 loans, with a total value of over US$100,000. 12 ADEMI and 
ADEPE eclipse both of these marks easily. 
ADOPEM has a ratio of loan officers to overall staff of 0.36, considerably less than 
ADEM! and ADEPE. ADOPEM's loan officers, however, disburse 403loans per year, more than 
double the figures put up by ADEMI and ADEPE. In addition, ADOPEM's average loan officer 
manages a portfolio of DR$1,303,000, about three-fourths the size of that managed by ADEMI's 
average loan officer, even though ADOPEM's average outstanding portfolio is less than one-
eighth the size of ADEMI's average outstanding portfolio. 
12 This mark is close to what most of the lenders studied here require of their loan officers, 
in order to qualify for performance bonuses. 
Table 4. All lenders: Operational Efficiency Indicators, 1994. 
ADEMI" ADEPE ADOPEM Candelaria• 
Personnel Resources 
Number of loan officers 99 4 17 
Number of loan staff 179 8 47 
Output Data 
Number of loans disbursed 13,184 686 6,848 
Number of loans to first-time borrowers 3,954 N/A N/A 
Amount disbursed (thousand current pesos) 295,270 10,560 30,000 
Average loan disbursed (current pesos) 22,396 15,394 4,381 
Portfolio Data 
Average outstanding loan portfolio (thousand current pesos) 159,855 5,921 19,207 
Average number of active loans 12,095 652 N/A 
Average outstanding active loan (current pesos) 13,217 9,081 N/A 
Average loan balance (current pesos)b 11,198 7,697 2,191 
Efficiency Indicators 
Output data indicators 
Number of loans disbursed/loan officer/year 133 172 403 
Amount disbursed/loan officer/year (thousand pesos) 2,983 2,640 1,765 
Portfolio Data Indicators 
Active loans/loan officer 123 163 N/A 
Outstanding portfolio/loan officer (thousand pesos) 1,768 1,569 1,303 
Active loans/loan staff 68 82 N/A 
Outstanding portfolio/loan staff (thousand pesos) 978 785 471 
--
Note: • Figures for Candelaria and FONDESA are for 1993. ADEMI figures include both small and micro loans. 
b One-half of average loan size. 
N/A 
N/A 
518 
N/A 
5,016 
9,683 
3,098 
N/A 
N/A 
4,842 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
FONDESA• 
5 
14 
261 
98 
5,450 
20,881 
4,132 
N/A 
N/A 
10,441 
52 
1,090 
N/A 
829 
N/A 
296 
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It seems that ADOPEM uses a higher ratio of support staff to loan officers to enable each 
loan officer to make an extraordinarily large number of small loans. It is possible that larger loans 
could be a source of improved profitability for ADOPEM, by increasing the amount of income 
per loan relative to the fixed cost of making the loan. It is also possible, however, that ADOPEM 
can make many loans per loan officer precisely because smaller loans mean smaller losses when 
default occurs. Thus, loan officers do not need to invest as much time and effort in screening 
potential borrowers and monitoring their repayment as they would if the loans were larger. Self-
sustainability in making such small loans will require somewhat higher interest rates, in any case. 
ADOPEM's average loan officer nearly reached the US$100,000 mark for their average 
outstanding gortfolios. ADOPEM, however, was not commercially profitable, whereas ADEMI 
was. Despite its operational efficiency, ADEPE is not commercially viable, either, given its 
extensive use of highly subsidized funds. 
FONDESA cannot boast of its operational efficiency. Its ratio of loan officers to overall 
staff is 0.36, equal to that of ADOPEM, but FONDESA does not balance the figure with 
impressive figures for numbers of loans nor for size of portfolio, as ADOPEM does. In spite of 
the fact that FONDESA's average loan size of DR$20,881 is surpassed only by ADEMI, the 
average outstanding portfolio of its loan officers stands at 829 (thousand 1992 pesos) per year, 
far less than for the other lenders. 
In short, FONDESA appears to be less (technically) efficient in comparison with the other 
lenders studied here. Despite FONDESA's having more staff to support its loan officers and its 
having an average loan size almost as large as ADEMI's, it has far fewer loans in the average loan 
officer's portfolio than do the other lenders, and the size of that average portfolio is smaller. This 
may provide some useful insight behind FONDESA's limited profitability. 
C. Institutional Vision 
Donors are less concerned about where a microfinance institution is now than they are 
about where the institution will be in the future. No NGO that lends will break free of subsidies 
and transform into a self-sufficient financial intermediary unless: 
(a) its personnel want to transform the institution; and 
(b) the organizational framework allows for transformation (Gonzalez-Vega). 
The qualitative assessment presented below reinforces results from the quantitative analysis 
discussed above for some of the lenders, but for others the two analyses provide contrasting impli-
cations. 
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1. ADEMI 
ADEMI has embodied the cutting-edge in microenterprise finance for 15 years, and the 
dean of Dominican microlenders continues to push itself to innovate and to improve. ADEMI 
pioneered the use of employee incentive schemes, and recently introduced a pension plan for all 
workers and a loan program for vehicle purchases for managers. It recognized that formal 
classroom instruction for borrowers had no effects beyond raising ADEMI's costs of operations 
and it replaced classes with field advice from loan officers on an as-requested basis. ADEMI 
provides a type of "deposit" service for its larger clients, and pays them a rate higher than the 
average rate paid on ADEMI's other liabilities. Although ADEMI is not regulated by the 
Dominican banking authorities, it has prepared itself to handle the contingency of a run by 
depositors. 
As an institution, ADEMI has built increases in productivity into the system. The 
computerized accounting and information management systems are focused on providing loan 
officers with the information needed to dun delinquent borrowers quickly. Staff conferences and 
continuing education are regular features of the institutional landscape. Finally, ADEMI's 
leadership in the person of Pedro Jimenez is nothing if not dynamic. 
While ADEMI does not scorn subsidies from donors, it views donors and their money as 
means to ADEMI's ends. ADEMI has solicited credit from commercial banks, and the commercial 
banks stand ready to lend, should ADEMI decide it wants the funds. ADEMI already pays 80 
percent of prime for the one-third of its portfolio borrowed from FondoMicro. It is a matter of 
time and donor discipline before ADEMI crosses the frontier to being commercially profitable 
while actually paying commercial interest rates for its funds. 
Funds and technical assistance from FondoMicro have no role in ADEMI's future. The 
only remaining role for donors in ADEMI's development is to nudge ADEMI out of the nest and 
leave it alone. ADEMI can fly already. Although building equity with donor largess and tax-
exempt status is not bad for the organization, ADEMI has better things to show the world. 
2. ADEPE 
ADEPE presents somewhat of a contradiction. Although its lending operation is profitable 
in accounting terms and it features elements conducive to self-sustainability, such as high opera-
tional efficiency, its institutional vision is not clearly focused on that goal. 
ADEPE's lending program exhibits elements of the state-of-the-art in that: 
(a) It pays its loan officers incentive payments for reducing the level of arrears in their 
portfolios. 
(b) It matches schedules of payments on agricultural loans to the sector's natural seasonality, 
while still requiring monthly payments from urban enterprise borrowers. 
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(c) It plans to shift away from agricultural loans and toward more-profitable urban loans. 
(d) It has switched from accrual to cash accounting. 
(e) It keeps accounts for the lending operation distinct from the accounts of its other projects, 
but still cross-subsidizes the latter with profits from the former. 
(f) It sanitized its portfolio, at the prodding of FondoMicro, ridding it of delinquent loans that 
had been carried for years. 
(g) It recognizes that the value of the institution is its accumulation of information about their 
clients' repayment probabilities. 
Unfortunately, ADEPE's institutional structure betrays some fundamental weaknesses: 
(a) It relies on two- to three-hour weekly meetings by volunteers on its board of directors 
(credit committee) to take care of many administrative matters, including the approval of 
loan applications. 
(b) It dabbles in non-financial projects, many of which are completely funded by donors. 
These projects detract from the organization's will to demand financial autonomy from any 
project and siphon profits from the lending program, that could be capitalized to allow for 
future growth. 
(c) It has never requested a loan from a commercial bank. It relies almost entirely on donor-
generated, subsidized liabilities. 
(d) It claims to have never experienced a default on a group loan, an unlikely event. 
(e) It tells the consultant researching this report that what it needs most from USAID is more 
funds at cheaper interest rates and for longer terms. 
(f) It adjusts its interest rate by the calendar rather than by the market. For example, after the 
monetary adjustments in September of 1994, the market rate jumped six percentage points. 
ADEPE's rate remained fixed because the semi-annual change had just been made in July. 
In the long run, the weaknesses of ADEPE as an organization may endanger its strengths 
as a lender. Its mothering of a gaggle of projects suggests that ADEPE will try anything a donor 
will fund. The weak projects lose money and eat up the profits earned by the strong projects. It 
may never overcome its high subsidy dependency. 
The final obstacle is the organization's attitude. ADEPE was founded in 1975 and it 
appears to have become entrenched in a paternalistic philosophy of development. The executive 
director believes that clients value ADEPE's training more than ADEPE's loans, and that 
borrowers need training to keep them from indebting themselves to the point of insolvency. The 
director envisions the organization as "the corrector of the dysfunctions of the economic system," 
and claims that the barrios would rise up in armed revolt if ADEPE did not have the funds to 
continue supplying them with loans. It seems unlikely that such views would be compatible with 
a program that is to be independent of subsidies in the long run. 
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Technical assistance from FondoMicro seems to have had a healthy effect on ADEPE's 
lending program, but it seems unlikely that FondoMicro or any donor can force a change in the 
organization's attitude toward operations in general. 
3. ADOPEM 
ADOPEM, second only to ADEMI in both numbers of loans and size of portfolio, 
implements several cutting-edge ideas drawn from the worldwide microfmance community. Still, 
ADOPEM is not yet commercially profitable, and several organizational problems remain. 
Overall, ADOPEM probably represents the best horse for a donor gamble in the near future. It 
is not far away from self-sustainablity. 
Like ADEMI, ADOPEM accepts unregulated "deposits" in the form ofloans from clients. 
ADOPEM has also implemented several innovations unique among the lenders in this study. For 
example, ADOPEM has introduced a scheduled savings scheme whose cash flows mimic those 
of the san, a ubiquitous informal financial instrument (ROSCA) in the Dominican Republic. 
Another example is its care in crafting incentives for its loan officers. Their portfolios grow by 
budding, as an experienced loan officer turns over half of his portfolio to a new loan officer. Part 
of the remuneration of all officers depends on the rate of growth of their portfolios and on the 
repayment records of their clients. 
ADOPEM also has some less-flashy and still important institutional strengths. It responded 
to a mandate from the Inter-American Development Bank to lend at low interest rates by requiring 
borrowers to keep compensating balances with the institution. This policy change, along with 
increased fees, partially made up for the decreased interest income. This mandate was unfortunate, 
however, as ADOPEM's interest earnings are not being sufficient to make it commercially viable. 
ADOPEM employs mobile collectors for its loans to groups, because the amounts are so small 
that requiring the groups' members to repay at ADOPEM's central offices, as is required of cli-
ents with individual loans, would create transactions costs that would swamp all other considera-
tions. Finally, ADOPEM has proposed a consortium with other microlenders to share bad-
borrower lists (credit-rating tool). 
Not all of ADOPEM's operations conform with the latest wisdom in microfmance. 
Deposits can be withdrawn only with three months' notice. When, in 1991, the Inter-American 
Development Bank suggested that ADOPEM could lose access to its Small Projects Loan, at 
below-market interest rates, if it borrowed elsewhere at below-market rates (from FondoMicro), 
ADOPEM temporarily stopped applying for funds from FondoMicro. All borrowers are charged 
two percent of their initial loan for training, whether the borrower attends the classes or not. 
Except for a mortgage on the office, ADOPEM has not borrowed from commercial banks without 
the support of donor guarantees. 
As with ADEPE, ADOPEM's biggest limitation may be its organizational habits. 
ADOPEM explicitly sees itself as a development institution rather than as a financial intermediary. 
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After all, it does not lend to just anyone who is creditworthy and who can repay; only poor wo-
men may apply. ADOPEM's attitude toward its clients is decidedly maternalistic: 
(a) ADOPEM believes that Dominican women would not have an entrepreneurial spirit if 
ADOPEM did not instill it in them. 
(b) The loan officer is known as a promotor. His job is to comb the barrios to locate women 
who, even though they are creditworthy and would have something to gain from 
borrowing, nevertheless have not contacted ADOPEM on their own. 
(c) ADOPEM gives women a can with a hole cut in the lid as a piggy bank in an effort to en-
courage them to save. The institution believes that the women did not save at all before 
becoming clients of ADOPEM. 
(d) ADOPEM believes that the women need training in order for their businesses to grow. 
Even with these few weaknesses, ADOPEM has a healthy long-term vision for itself and 
its role in micro finance in the Dominican Republic. If FondoMicro and its funds were to disap-
pear, ADOPEM's management says it would probably cut off the institution's training arm, turn 
to commercial banks for funds, and survive. Donor's forcing such measures, however, would be 
more appropriate with ADEMI than with ADOPEM. Donors should encourage ADOPEM to de-
velop the capacity to make the larger loans that would seem to be the highest hurdle currently sep-
arating ADOPEM and commercial profitability. In fact, one of the items on ADOPEM's wish list 
from donors is loan officers specially trained for lending to small businesses. ADOPEM should 
also understand that continued focus on very small loans would require somewhat higher interest 
rates. 
4. Cooperativa Candelaria 
Research for this report did not include a site visit to Cooperativa Candelaria, and thus 
there is limited scope for a qualitative evaluation of its institutional vision and prospects for long-
term development. Visits were made to AIRAC, the association of fmancial cooperatives, created 
by the earlier Ohio State University Rural Financial Markets Project, of which Cooperativa 
Candelaria is a member, and some conclusions can be drawn from AIRAC's general track record. 
The cooperatives are unique in that they are already commercially viable and independent 
of donor subsidies. Through AIRAC, they have banded together to provide each other with a 
quasi-interbank funds market, a monitor of financial health, and, not unimportantly, a brand 
name. AIRAC members pay for the association's services, do not target loans, and have no 
significant non-financial projects to distract them. 
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AIRAC also recognizes its weaknesses and is working to ameliorate them: 13 
(a) As a de facto regulator with no power to close dangerously weak cooperatives, AIRAC 
welcomes the idea of putting the cooperatives under the formal coercive and regulatory 
power of the government's Superintendency of Banks. 
(b) The cooperative governance system of one-member, one-vote makes individual 
cooperatives vulnerable to domination by borrowers to the detnment of savers, and 
AIRAC is working on a scheme which would give those members with more invested in 
a cooperative a comparatively greater voice in its decisions. 
(c) As an incentive beyond that of being able to use membership in AIRAC as a signal to 
depositors of safety and soundness, AIRAC plans to grade cooperatives into at least two 
levels based on their financial strength. 
The cooperatives are thriving without donor funds. Their total assets of DR$243 million 
exceed those of ADEM!. Virtually all of the liabilities of the cooperatives are acquired on purely 
market terms. Only two cooperatives, Candelaria and Neyba, have borrowed from FondoMicro, 
and this borrowing represents only about two percent of the portfolios of these intermediaries. The 
cooperatives do not want dump trucks of donor subsidies. They know that their absorptive capa-
city for outside funds is low, and they are wary of the incentive-destroying effects such outside 
funds have had on financial cooperatives in the past. 
5. FONDESA 
The future of FONDESA is more murky than that of other organizations examined here, 
perhaps with the exception of ADEPE. There are several reasons to hope that FONDESA will 
reverse the poor financial results of the past and improve its relatively inefficient operations. The 
president of FONDESA's board has a dynamic, long-run vision for the organization and appears 
to be up-to-date on the latest ideas concerning how to run a self-sufficient microfmance institution. 
For example, he believes that USAID and FondoMicro deserve places on FONDESA's board and 
would be welcomed there. The executive director is young and energetic. Since his installation 
in July, 1993, he has made radical reforms to the program's policies, including incentives for loan 
officers based on the size and number of loans in their portfolios and on their recuperation rates. 
The importance in the institution's portfolio of loans to groups has decreased dramatically. 
Two FondoMicro technicians spend two days a week working with the organization's personnel, 
and FONDESA has developed a strategic plan with the help of FondoMicro, the principal thrust 
of which is fmancial self-sufficiency through increased returns on the portfolio, cost controls, re-
13 In many ways, AIRAC is a credit cooperative of credit cooperatives, and thus it is subject 
to many of the same critiques that apply to the traditional credit cooperative itself. See Chaves 
(1994). 
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formed policies, and effective recuperation procedures. FONDESA has borrowed DR$1 million 
on market terms from Banco Popular, and it is applying for another DR$3 million from commer-
cial banks. 
Be that as it may, FONDESA has yet to show that it has turned the corner. In fact, its 
operational efficiency is not encouraging. Of the five lenders studied here, FONDESA charges 
the highest monthly interest rate for its loans but still shows the lowest accounting profit (return 
on assets). Its loans have an average size that ranks just below that of ADEM!, and yet the 
outstanding portfolio of the average loan officer is smaller than those of the other lenders studied 
here. Thus, FONDESA uses more inputs to produce less outputs. In addition, FONDESA remains 
wedded to the idea that training of borrowers is essential to success in lending, even though 
borrowers are not willing to pay for the full costs of that training. This emphasis on training adds 
to its costs, while the experience of the other lenders shows that its contribution to a successful 
financial operation is not significant. 
Whether FONDESA will tum itself around has yet to be seen. The will seems to be there, 
but past problems will, at best, lengthen the process of reform and, at worst, derail it. Time will 
tell if FONDESA can acquire the capacity to reduce costs and improve efficiency. Given this un-
certainty and FONDESA's small size, donors may wish to continue to rely on loans and technical 
assistance from FondoMicro as their chief means of support for FONDESA. The long-term 
perspective of its present management would make this a reasonable investment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The final analysis must acknowledge that ADEM! and the AIRAC cooperatives dwarf 
ADEPE, ADOPEM, and FONDESA in size, in profitability, and in prospects for continued 
service. It would not be incorrect to link the relative sizes and futures of the lenders studied here 
directly to their history of profitability. Nor would it be inappropriate to link their history of 
profitability to how closely their operating philosophy resembles that of a commercial bank rather 
than that of a development agency. Future assistance from FondoMicro will promote micro finance 
in the Dominican Republic inasmuch as it promotes a philosophy focused on commercial 
profitability. 
All five lenders examined here seem to have adopted the financial technologies that have 
garnered an international consensus as being the best tools currently available for reaching self-
sustainability. Not all five, however, have had equal success in implementing those tools within 
their specific institutional settings. Loans and technical assistance from FondoMicro should 
continue to be allocated with the idea of providing incentives for those lenders who already 
possess the proper tools to use them with materials purchased at market prices. In particular, loans 
from FondoMicro should not crowd out loans from commercial banks, as has happened in the past 
with ADEMI and FONDESA. 
27 
ADEMI remains the showcase. It continues to grow and improve. Its recent expansion into 
lending to small businesses has decreased the relative importance of micro loans in its portfolio, 
but not their absolute importance, and the earnings from the new market can only strengthen the 
institution. ADEMI towers over the other lenders, disbursing almost five times as much as the 
other four combined. ADEMI is ready to strike out on its own. 
ADEPE's lending program is operationally efficient but not commercially profitable. The 
tininess of the lending program and the lack of focus of the overall institution could very well 
hamper fulfillment of its potential. Paternalistic attitudes must also be overcome. 
ADOPEM efficiently provides very small loans to a very large number of women. 
Unfortunately, it seems that efficiently providing this product is not enough for commercial 
profitability. The outlook for ADOPEM is good if it can increase the size of its loans without 
increasing the risk it must bear or if it can increase interest rates to be able to cover its costs 
without subsidy dependency. Increasing loan sizes and charging higher rates will also require 
unlearning some attitudes. Self-sustainability is, however, within reach. 
Cooperativa Candelaria and the other members of AIRAC prove microfmance can be self-
sustainable. Evolution based on slow, safe growth with retained earnings and funds raised (as 
deposits) from the public would undoubtedly be a model preferred by donors if such growth were 
not so slow and if it did not require such careful attention to individual institutions during the 
initial stages. Credit cooperatives must overcome, nevertheless, shortcomings emerging from its 
property rights and governance structure (Chaves). Slow growth, high requirements of outside as-
sistance, and diffused property rights and governance structures would be salient features of 
NGOs as well. No dominant organizational design seems to emerge from best practice elsewhere, 
but clear lessons offmancial practice have been universally learned (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham). 
In quantitative terms, FONDESA presents the bleakest outlook. Its profitability and ef-
ficiency are the lowest among lenders in the study. These poor figures may, however, have 
resulted from having to write off huge portions of its portfolio that were lost in the years before 
the present management was installed. Qualitatively, the institution seems to have personnel with 
the knowledge and desire to turn the lender around. Whether FONDESA will be successful or not 
is uncertain but not impossible. 
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Appendix I 
ADJUSTMENTS TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS 
This appendix discusses the calculations used in the analyses performed in this report. It 
first discusses the calculations of the figures that appear in the main body of the text, before 
discussing the figures that appear only in Appendix II, which details the financial results of the 
individual lenders. 
A. Adjusting nominal to real figures 
Except for figures pertaining to arrears and adequacy of provisioning, all figures in this 
report have been converted to real 1992 Dominican pesos. This conversion helps keep the effects 
of inflation from masking the true trends surfacing in the lender's operation over time. For 
reference, Table I.l provides the inflation rate, the average exchange rate of the peso against the 
dollar, the average prime rate (on loans) in the commercial banking sector, and the average 
passbook savings rate for the period. 
The inflation figures are derived from Central Bank reports and may not be an entirely 
accurate reflection of the price changes observed by participants in financial markets, but they 
represent the best estimates available. Note that adjusting for inflation means that the sum of 
accumulated and capitalized earnings presented on a balance sheet for one year does not equal the 
capitalized earnings carried into the next year. Backing out the inflation adjustment will restore 
the equality. 
Table I.l. Monetary Statistics, Dominican Republic, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
Inflation rate (annual percentages) 4.2 2.9 14.3 
Average exchange rate (pesos per US$) 12.58 12.50 12.85 
Prime rate, commercial bank loans(%) 24.6 24.8 24.1 
Passbook savings rate (%) 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Source: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana. 
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B. Adjusting the financial statements 
In accordance with guidelines of the InterArnerican Development Bank (1994) for the 
analysis of microenterprise finance institutions, the raw data provided in the financial statements 
from the lenders were adjusted, in an attempt to reflect better their true financial position. These 
adjustments took four basic forms: 
1. Adjustments to provision expenses and write-offs. 
The IDB guidelines call for writing-off any loan with payments more than 90 days 
overdue. In addition, they suggest that the reserve for loan losses should be equal to at least the 
sum of 10 percent of the value of loans with payments one to 30 days overdue; 25 percent of the 
value of loans with payments 31 to 60 days overdue; and 50 percent of the value of loans with 
payments 61 to 90 days overdue. The analysis here adjusts provisions and write-offs accordingly 
and makes the corresponding adjustments to the portfolio account. In most years, most lenders 
carried as many loans 90 or more days overdue as they did loans in arrears for less than 90 days. 
Writing-off loans delinquent for more than 90 days is probably the biggest single source of 
differences between the adjusted balance sheets presented in this report and the original ones 
presented by the lending organizations themselves. 
2. Adjustments for grants and donations. 
Some lenders received grants that were not reported in the financial statements. Usually, 
these were in-kind donations, such as computer equipment. When possible, the value of these 
grants was included in the statement of profits and losses as donation income and an offsetting 
expense was recorded. 
3. Adjustments for accrual accounting. 
According to IDB guidelines, interest accrued on loan payments that has yet to be received 
by the lender should not be counted as income. This is a conservative accounting convention, 
whose intent is to prevent the reporting as income of the interest accrued on bad loans that the 
lender has no realistic chance of ever collecting. The lending organizations under study invariably 
presented an asset account labeled as "accrued interest." Although all the lenders under study had 
switched from accrual to cash accounting by 1994, it was noted that the balance in the interest 
accrued account was generally too large to represent only "interest accrued" on deposits owned 
by the lender in other financial intermediaries. To be conservative (as strict as possible) any 
amount labeled as accrued interest was merged into the portfolio account. The results of the 
analysis under this convention did not differ in order and direction from the results obtained when 
accrued interest was maintained as a separate account. 
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4. Other adjustments. 
Many other adjustments were needed to make the financial statements conform with the 
IDB guidelines. For example, for some years and for some lenders, arrears were presented as one 
single unaged figure rather than aged in 30-day brackets. It was again conservatively assumed (on 
the basis of observed trends) that all these arrears were older than 90 days (strict criterion). 
In a few instances, more than one balance sheet existed for a lending organization for a 
given year. In other cases, the sum of accumulated earnings and capitalized earnings from one 
year did not equal the capitalized earnings presented for the following year. In still other cases, 
an account labeled "adjustments" appeared in the capital section of the balance sheet and seemed 
to be an accounting plug to make assets equal the sum of liabilities and equity. In all of these 
cases, the analysts exercised judgement and tried to err on the side of underestimating equity, 
assets, and profits, and overestimating arrears. It also came to pass that financial results were not 
always available from all lenders in all years. In these cases, financial data on the borrowing 
institution were obtained from FondoMicro. 
These adjustments are reflected in the balance sheets that appear in Appendix II. Notes 
concerning specific adjustments and assumptions made for specific lenders accompany the balance 
sheets presented there. The sources of data, the conventions employed, and the intermediate 
calculations have been documented and are available on request. 
The analysis here does not pretend to approach anything resembling an audit. Most lenders 
were visited for less than half a day. Most discussion focused on the management's vision for the 
institution and the institution's relationship with USAID and FondoMicro rather than on 
accounting practices. The figures here should be, therefore, viewed merely as broad indicators 
of trends, directions, and orders of magnitude. They are sufficient, however, to derive interesting 
conclusions. 
C. Measures of financial results 
1. Measures of Accounting Profitability 
Return on assets is defined as net income in the period divided by the average level of 
assets in the period. Average assets are calculated, as are all average figures in this report, as the 
simple average of assets at the year's start (last year's end) and assets at the year's end. These 
simple year-end averages were observed not to differ substantially from the averages that were 
derived when monthly figures were used. The year-end figures were used to increase 
comparability, because monthly figures were not available for some of the lending organizations. 
Return on equity (ROE) is defined as net income in a period divided by the average level 
of equity in the period. Equity is defmed as the difference between assets and liabilities, or as the 
difference between what an entity owns and what it owes. As a lender is fmanced more with debt, 
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such as with borrowings from FondoMicro or with deposits from the general public, ROE will 
be higher for a given level of net income (due to leverage). 
2. Measure of Subsidy Dependency 
The Subsidy Dependency Index (SDI) was developed by Yaron (1992). Examples of its 
use appear in Yaron (1992 and 1994) and in Gurgand et al. (1994). The index gives the 
percentage increase in the average on-lending interest rate were the lender to pay commercial rates 
for all its funds, operate without subsidies, and break even in accounting terms, holding all other 
factors unchanged. 
For the purposes of this report, the shadow (imputed) price of the lender's equity, 
donations, and subsidized funds is taken to be the prime (loan) rate in the commercial banking 
sector. Although Yaron (1992) suggests the use of the rate that would have to be paid to 
depositors as the implicit price of funds, this is not appropriate here, because the Dominican 
microlenders would turn to commercial lenders, not depositors, if subsidies were to end. More-
over, they would even have to pay rates higher than prime in order to gain access to bank credit, 
given the riskiness of their portfolios and weak organizational design. The commercial loan rate 
in the Dominican banking system for the relevant years appears in Table I.1 above. 
The SDI was calculated by dividing the total subsidy implicitly received by the lender by 
the total interest income actually received by the lender. The implicit subsidy has several 
components. All outright donations were counted as subsidy. There is an implicit subsidy 
associated with the lender's use of equity, because the organization does not have to pay a private 
investor a return. The implicit cost of equity was taken to be the average level of equity in the 
year multiplied by the prime rate in the commercial banking sector, a figure which probably un-
derestimates the return that private investors would expect from an investment as risky as a micro-
finance organization. The implicit subsidy associated with soft loans from donors was taken to be 
the difference between what the lender did pay on its borrowings and what it would have had to 
pay (the prime rate found in the market). Finally, profits represent earnings that would normally 
accrue to private owners and thus are the implicit subsidy is reduced by the period's profits. 
A negative SDI suggests that a lender could have been commercially profitable; it could 
have reduced the rate of interest it charges on its loans and still would have been able to pay for 
its liabilities, even if those liabilities had market prices. A positive SDI suggests that the lender 
would have to increase the rate charged on its loans if it were to earn a profit and pay market 
prices for its funds. 
3. Measure of donor leverage 
The Donor Leverage Ratio (DLR) developed here indicates how many pesos of assets (or, 
alternatively, loan portfolio) a lender generated for use in microfmance for each peso of liabilities 
subsidized by donors, assuming that the subsidized pesos are not withdrawn by the donors at the 
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end of the period. The DLR is a simple ratio formulated here on the basis of concepts developed 
in Rosenberg (1994). The numerator is the level of assets at the end of the period, less earnings 
accumulated from previous periods, or alternatively the value of the outstanding portfolio. The 
denominator consists of the sum total of all subsidized funds used by the lender. Loans from 
commercial banks that are backed with donor guarantees are considered to be subsidized. A DLR 
below unity indicates that the lender has not turned the donor investment into increased resources 
at the service of microfinance. A DLR greater than unity indicates that the lender has generated 
some level of market-priced funds. 
Rosenberg (1994) has proposed a typology ofmicrofinance institutions based, among other 
things, on the DLR: 
Level I: 
Level II: 
Level III: 
Level IV: 
Level V: 
The institution is not profitable even in accounting terms. The DLR is below one. 
The institution shows an accounting profit, but has little or no equity. Its loan 
portfolio is funded via soft loans from donors. The DLR is about one. 
The institution shows an accounting profit, but a donor has made donations that do 
not need to be repaid, generating equity for the institution. For each peso of equity, 
the institution can borrow about another peso on the commercial market. The DLR 
is about two. 
The institution shows an accounting profit, has an equity base, and possesses a 
license as some type of formal financial institution. The license signals financial 
strength to potential creditors. The public, be they commercial banks or private 
depositors, are willing to lend the organization up to some multiple of the institu-
tion's equity base. The DLR could be as high as 12. 
The institution makes such high profits that private investors start microfinance 
institutions as a purely profit producing proposition (demonstration effect). The 
DLR is arbitrarily high. 
Cooperativa Candelaria would fall in Level IV, inasmuch as its DLR is over 100 (between 
119 and 145). It does not have, however, a license from a formal regulatory authority that would 
sanction its deposit mobilization activities. In fact, the Dominican Superintendency of Banks does 
not even regulate fmancial cooperatives at all. AIRAC has requested such a prudential framework. 
Thse cooperatives are true fmancial intermediaries and lend mostly from locally mobilized 
deposits. Any donor funds they use are insignificant. As was the case with the SDI, interpretation 
of the DLR in this case must be extremely cautious and must not suggest causality. 
ADEMI has a DLR of about 1.5 or even two and it would fall in Level III. Part of its 
portfolio is funded by retained earnings and by "deposits" from the public, but soft loans from 
donors continue to make up the largest part of its liabilities. As a result of such strong donor 
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inclination to fund ADEMI, not much leverage is achieved. Abundant donor support potentially 
discourages local funds mobilization. Since it would not be advisable for ADEMI to grow faster 
than it has, however, donor funding has been sufficient for its expansion. The organization's 
profitability would allow it to attract, however, local funds at market terms if it was forced to. 
ADOPEM and ADEPE have DLR indicators around unity and thus would fall in Level II. 
Both show an accounting profit, but neither raises a significant amount of funds from the market. 
ADOPEM does show a small amount of (forced) savings from its clients, through compensating 
balances required when obtaining a loan, which can hardly be considered as market-generated 
deposits but are not donor-generated either. ADOPEM has some funds from commercial loans, 
while ADEPE relies almost entirely on donor funds and its accumulated equity. The only "return" 
on the donors' investment are retained profits channelled into lending rather than ADEPE's other 
activities. 
FONDESA's DLR is also around unity, but would probably qualify for Level I only. 
Although it had not shown an accounting profit in the earlier two years, it has improved its 
performance in 1994 and, if it continues along this route, it will reach level II soon. 
As may be evident, this typology involving use of the DLR has several weaknesses: 14 
1. The DLR (at a given point in time) does not forecast the amount of pesos that a single 
donor-subsidized peso now will generate for use in microfmance in the future. Rather, it 
indicates how many pesos of loan assets the lender has relative to each peso of subsidized 
funds among its liabilities. That is, it shows a picture at a given point in time, not the 
potential influence of the donor funds over time. If there are lags, the DLR will increase 
over time. For example, a new fmancial institution may not utilize at first all the leverage 
authorized by prudential regulation. An appropriate indicator will be a ratio of the present 
value of aU corresponding future assets and liabilities, but this is difficult to estimate. 
2. Subsidized funds are assumed to "cause" non-subsidized funds, but in fact there may be 
no such cause and effect. Clearly, the DR$39,000 pesos that donors subsidized for 
Cooperativa Candelaria are not responsible for its mobilization of DR$4,096,000 in 
deposits from the public. The problems of interpretation encountered here are typical of 
all impact studies. Just as funds lent to borrowers are fungible, creating intractable 
difficulties in measuring the additionality created by a loan, funds lent to organizations are 
fungible and subsidized funds can not take all the credit for enabling an institution to 
mobilize funds from commercial sources. Moreover, in some circumstances there may 
actually be an inverse causality, with donor funds discouraging the mobilization of non-
donor funds (substitution effects). 
14 These weaknesses refer to the indicator developed here to capture the critical concept 
discussed by Rosenberg, not to the concept itself. 
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3. Although it describes features of well-know organizational types, many institutions may 
not fit all the criteria for any single level in the Rosenberg typology. Any classification is 
thus tentative. 
4. The DLR calculation here gives soft loans from FondoMicro, costing 80 percent of prime, 
the same weight as outright donations (to equity accounts). Similar problems were faced 
in classifying donor-guaranteed loans from commercial sources. 15 A more complex weight-
ing system than used here may be appropriate in more detailed studies. 
The ideal measure of an institution's performance would tell a donor three things: 
1. Whether the fledgling institution is making progress, or if it is at least trying in good faith, 
in heading toward the goal of self-sustainability. 
2. If progress is satisfactory, what are the amounts involved and over what timeline would 
further subsidies strengthen the institution and its learning process rather than encouraging 
it to get fat and lazy. 
3. Whether the fledgling can survive being pushed out of the nest. 
Although the DLR as applied here and Rosenberg's (1994) typology do not address all of 
these needs perfectly, they are still useful tools. Given that the technology exists for operating 
self-sustainable microfmance organizations, these measures focus attention on the problem of mo-
bilizing sufficient funds to take advantage of such technology (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham). These 
funds must ultimately come from the public and be priced by the market. The DLR provides a 
useful indicator of direction and orders of magnitude in mobilizing market-generated funds. 
For reference, the proportion of each lender's portfolio funded by FondoMicro appears 
in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3. All Lenders: Proportion of the Portfolio Funded By FondoMicro (percent), 1994. 
ORGANIZATION % 
ADEMI 28 
ADEPE 25 
ADOPEM 50 
Candelaria 1 
FONDESA 45 
15 In this case, the donor investment is not the entire amount of the organization's equity 
(loan), but only the donor's contingent liability (expected loss). 
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Table 1.2. All Lenders: Traditional Profitability, Subsidy Dependency Index, and Donor 
Leverage Ratio, 1992-1994. 
I Lender Measure I 1992 I 1993 I 1994 I 
ADEMI ROA 0.20 0.17 0.13 
ROE 0.47 0.41 0.30 
SDI 
-0.17 -0.09 -0.02 
DLRa 1.64 1.66 1.46 
DLRb 1.94 1.95 1.83 
ADEPE ROAC -0.09 -0.02 0.45 
ROAd N/C N/C 0.11 
ROEC 
-0.24 -0.07 1.30 
ROEd N!C N/C 0.28 
SDI N!C N/C 0.99 
DLRa N/C NIC 1.17 
DLRb N/C NIC 1.25 
ADOPEM ROA -0.01 0.05 0.06 
ROE -0.02 0.23 0.33 
SDI 0.33 0.33 0.37 
DLRa 1.02 1.08 1.16 
DLRb 1.12 0.95 1.09 
FONDESA ROA -0.01 -0.04 0.03 
ROE -0.03 -0.17 0.19 
SDI 0.27 0.45 0.20 
DLRa 0.99 0.96 1.04 
DLRb 1.08 1.07 1.01 
Note: N/ A means not available, N/C means non calculable. 
a Defined as assets minus capitalized earnings divided by donor-generated liabilities. 
b Defined as the ratio of the loan portfolio divided by donor-generated liabilities. 
c Refers to ADEPE's total operation. 
d Refers to ADEPE's lending activity only. 
Source: Computed by the authors on the basis of unpublished, adjusted records. 
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Table 1.2 presents ROA, ROE, SDI, and DLR indicators for 1992 to 1994 for the four 
NGO lenders. Sufficient data for Cooperativa Candelaria were not obtained from FondoMicro. 
Details of the intermediate calculations of the SDI and the DLR for the individual lending 
organizations appear in Appendix II. 
D. Measures of financial trend 
The growth rates of assets, liabilities, and equity are calculated from the adjusted balance 
sheets as the ratio of the difference between the amount at the previous year's end over the amount 
at the year's end. 
E. Measures of operational efficiency 
All of the measures of operational efficiency are derived straightforwardly, as indicated 
in the original table in the text. The average active loan outstanding was taken to be the loan 
amount at the end of the previous year plus that at the end of the year divided by two. The 
average loan outstanding balance was computed as the average (initial) loan size divided by two. 16 
F. Measures of loan conditions 
Two measures appearing in table 1 on loan conditions require explanation. The real 
effective monthly interest rate is calculated as that interest rate which would make the cash flows 
associated with the loan and its payments have a present value of exactly zero at the time the loan 
is disbursed (IDB, 1994). 17 Consider the example of a micro loan from ADEM!. The average 
initial loan is DR$17 ,430. After the fee of six percent of the initial amount is deducted from the 
disbursement, the borrower actually receives DR$16,384. The nominal monthly interest rate is 
2.5 percent, charged (uniformly) each month over the initial amount of the loan irrespective of 
repayment of the principal, thus implying monthly interest payments of DR$436. For a ten-month 
loan, with equal monthly amortization, the monthly principal repayment would be DR$1,743, and 
the total monthly payment would be DR$2, 179. This figure (appropriately deflated) appears in 
Table 1 in the text as the average monthly payment by the borrower. The discount rate that makes 
the present value of 10 payments of DR$2,179 equal to the present value of DR$16,384 now is 
5.6 percent per month. The inflation rate in 1994 in the Dominican Republic was 14.3 percent, 
16 For the portfolio at large this assumes that all loans have the same term to maturity and that 
the portfolio is in steady state. 
17 This rate is known as the Internal Rate of Return on the sequence of cash flows. 
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or 1.2 percent per month. Subtracting this from the 5.6 percent gives the 4.4 percent that appears 
in the table as the real effective monthly interest rate. 18 
G. Figures in Appendix II 
1. Balance sheets 
Adjustments made to the balance sheets were explained above. Any notes specific to an 
individual lender are made after the presentation of that lender's balance sheets in 
Appendix II. 
2. Subsidy Dependency Index 
This table presents details (items) useful in the calculation of the Subsidy Dependency 
Index, including subsidy components. 
3. Donor Leverage Ratio 
This table presents details useful in the calculation of the Donor Leverage Ratio, for two 
alternative versions: with or without deduction of capitalized earnings from total assets 
and with respect to performing assets (loans). 
4. Profitability analysis 
The figures in this table are calculated as proportions of the annual average portfolio, 
without netting out reserves. This approach is useful for detecting changes in various 
revenues and costs over time and how these changes affect the institution's return on 
performing assets. 
5. Balance sheet distribution 
The various accounts from the balance sheet are presented as proportions of the lender's 
total assets. This table is useful for determining if the institution has a disproportionately 
large amount of fixed (and other non-performing) assets. 
6. Analysis of income structure 
This table presents credit income, other income, and donation (grant) income as 
proportions of the portfolio (without netting out reserves) and as proportions of total 
18 The real rate was approximated by the difference between the nominal interest rate and the 
inflation rate, ignoring second-order terms, given the low rates of inflation. 
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income. The purpose of the table is to detect the relative importance of donations and non-
credit income in the financial institution's revenues. 
7. Analysis of operational cost structure 
This table presents administrative costs, depreciation, other costs, provision expenses, and 
financial expenses as proportions of the portfolio (without netting out reserves) and as 
proportions of total expenses. An institution that is progressing should see an increasing 
proportion of its expenses going to financial costs and a smaller proportion to 
administration. 
8. Analysis of unadjusted arrears 
The figures in this table have not been adjusted in accordance with the IDB's guidelines, 
but rather were lifted straight from the institution's fmancial statements. Ideally, all loans 
with payments 90 days or more overdue would be written off. 
9. Loan collections and unadjusted provisions for bad loans 
The first part of this table presents the amount that came due during the year and the 
amount that the lender lost during the year. Losses are defmed as the write-offs of the year 
plus any increase from the previous year in the amount of loans with payments overdue 
by 90 days or more. Recuperation is the percentage collected of the total amount that 
should have been collected. 
The second part of the table presents various indicators of portfolio risk and of the lender's 
ability to provide for that risk. If the lender is effective at collecting overdue loans and if 
the lender diligently writes off uncollectible loans, then the ratio for arrears over the 
outstanding portfolio may be larger than the ratio of reserves over the outstanding 
portfolio. The ratio of losses over total disbursements and the ratio of provisions over total 
disbursements should be about equal for a lender which responsibly accounts for the fact 
of uncollectible loans and which is not growing explosively or otherwise in some state of 
flux. 
Appendix II 
NOTES ON INDIVIDUAL LENDERS AND ADJUSTED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
A. ADEM! 
This section presents a brief historical background on ADEM!, highlighting its operational 
policies and some key dimensions of its loan contracts. Several tables derive relevant financial 
information, followed by clarification notes. 
ADEMI was founded in 1983. By early 1995 it boasted 24 branches in 20 cities. Between 
1992 and 1994, ADEMI's loan portfolio grew at an outstanding average rate of 35.9 percent per 
year in real terms and its assets almost doubled (see balance sheet in Table ILl). Its loan portfolio 
represented 87 percent of total assets, a comparatively high proportion. Deposits were 23 percent 
of liabilities in 1993, but this proportion declined in 1994. ADEMI also accumulated equity 
rapidly, at a real rate of 35.7 percent per year during the period. 
All the financial statements used in this analysis had been audited. Some information from 
statements prepared by FondoMicro was also used. The 1994 portfolio contains DR$3,297,194 
which are not counted as arrears but which represent loans whose collection has been classified 
as being in "administraci6n judicial." This is a classification of ADEMI's and apparently it does 
not imply that legal proceedings are being undertaken in order to collect the loans. The analysis 
did not count these loans as being part of arrears, nor did it write them off. The authors were 
unable to verify the true nature of this account, however. 
It was noted in the main text that loans to small businesses carry different terms than do 
loans to microenterprises. Loans under DR$50,000 have a six percent fee charged up front and 
carry a monthly nominal interest rate of 2.5 percent. According to data from FondoMicro, the 
average term for these loans is ten months. Loans between DR$50,000 and DR$200,000 carry 
a two percent fee and charge interest at the nominal rate of three percent a month, over the 
decreasing unpaid balance. Loans from DR$200,000 to DR$800,000 carry a two percent fee and 
charge a yearly rate of 30 percent over the outstanding balance. 
Loan officers are university graduates with degrees in economics or business. Loan 
officers with more than 130 clients in their portfolio, a portfolio of over US$100,000, and arrears 
under eight percent receive a bonus of 40 to 50 percent of their monthly salary. 
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Table 11.1. ADEMI: Adjusted Financial Statements, 1992-1994. 
ASSETS 1992 I 1993 I 1994 
Cash and deposits 5,839 13,717 14,385 
Loan portfolio 94,798 144,711 174,999 
(Reserve for bad loans) (1 ,062) (1,455) (1,814) 
Fixed assets (net) 6,739 8,261 11,180 
Other assets 3,001 3,477 3,049 
Total Assets 111,307.00 168,702 201,800 
LIABILITIES 
Loans 44,277 72,004 90,334 
Deposits 13,835 22,899 19,645 
Other liabilities 4,632 4,217 6,107 
Total liabilities 62,744 99,121 116,086 
EQUITY 
Capitalized earnings 28,918 45,484 62,343 
Accumulated earnings 17,653 24,097 23,371 
Total equity 46,571 69,581 85,714 
Total liabilities and equity 109,315 168,702 201,800 
INCOME 
Credit income 43,834 54,566 63,234 
Donation income 553 6,471 0 
Other income 1,856 2,400 5,098 
Total income 46,243 63,437 68,332 
EXPENSES 
Administration 16,165 19,580 20,810 
Provisions for bad loans 2,762 3,116 7,393 
Depreciation 303 403 448 
Other expenses 339 0 169 
Total Operating Costs 19,569 23,100 28,820 
Financial costs 9,021 16,240 16,141 
Total expenses 28,590 39,339 44,961 
NET INCOME 17,653 24,097 23,371 
Note: All figures are in thousand pesos at constant 1992 prices (real terms). 
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In 1991, ADEMI had loans outstanding from Banco Popular worth DR$9.5 million. This 
implies that a decrease in the use of funds from commercial sources coincided with an increase 
in funds from FondoMicro (fungibility). Loans from all sources increased an outstanding 42.8 
percent per year in real terms, from 1992 to 1994, allowing a substantial increase in operations. 
The negative implicit interest subsidy on borrowed funds in 1993 (shown in Table II.2) 
could have resulted from ADEMI's paying interest rates on deposits and whatever few commercial 
loans it had that were in fact higher than the prime loan rate that is being used here to impute a 
cost to soft loans. There is a negative implicit subsidy for this year also in an SDI calculation that 
appears in one of ADEMI's (1994b) publications. It is ADEMI's ability to generate profits well 
above the shadow rate of return (prime) that leads to a negative SDI. 
Table 11.2. ADEMI: Subsidy Dependency Index, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
Average annual borrowed funds 38,622 58,141 81,169 
Actual financial cost 9,021 16,240 16,141 
Shadow financial cost 9,513 14,390 19,561 
Implicit subsidy on borrowings 492 -1,850 3,420 
Average annual equity 37,744 58,076 77,647 
Actual profits 17,653 24,097 23,371 
Shadow return on equity 9,296 14,374 18,713 
Implicit subsidy on equity -8,357 -9723 -4658 
Other subsidies 553 6,471 0 
TOTAL SUBSIDY -7,312 -5,102 -1,237 
Interest actually earned on portfolio 43,834 54,566 63,234 
SUBSIDY DEPENDENCY INDEX I -0.17 -0.09 -o.o2l 
Note: All amounts in thousands of reall992 pesos. The SDI would be the same if the subsidy 
is computed in nominal terms. 
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Table H.3. ADEMI: Donor Leverage Ratio, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
(1) Total assets less capitalized earnings 80,397 123,218 139,457 
(2) Loan portfolio 94,798 144,711 174,999 
(3) Deposits 13,835 22,899 19,645 
( 4) Commercial borrowmg 0 2,000 1,000 
(5) Lmbiht1es from the market 13,835 24,899 20,645 
(6) Liabilities from donors 48,909 74,221 95,441 
LEVERAGE OF DONOR LIABILITIES 
VersiOn 1: (1)/(6) 1.64 1.66 1 46 
Version 2: (2)/(6) 1.94 1.95 1.83 
Table 11.4. ADEMI: Profitability Analysis (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
Financial income 61 53 43 
Financial costs 12 14 10 
Gross Financial Margin 49 39 33 
Operating costs 26 19 18 
Net Operating Margin 23 20 15 
Imputed capital costs 13 10 14 
MARGIN 10 10 1 
Required yield on portfolio 50 43 42 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of the average annual portfolio. 
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Table U.S. ADEMI: Balance Sheet Distribution (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I_ 1994 
ASSETS 
Cash 5 8 7 
Loan portfolio (net) 86 85 86 
Fixed assets (net) 6 5 6 
Other assets 3 2 2 
LIABILITIES and EQUITY 
Loans 41 43 45 
Deposits 13 14 10 
Other liabilities 4 2 3 
Capitalized earnings 26 27 31 
Accumulated earnings 16 14 12 
Note: All proportions computed as percentages with respect to total assets. 
Table II.6. ADEMI: Analysis of Income Structure, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
% of % ofTotal %of % ofTotal %of % ofTotal 
Portfolio Income Portfolio Income Portfolio Income 
Credit income 57 95 46 86 40 93 
Other income 2 4 2 4 3 7 
Donations 1 1 5 10 0 0 
TOTAL 61 100 53 100 43 100 
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Table II.7. ADEMI: Analysis of Operational Cost Structure, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
% of % of %of 
%of Total % of Total % of Total 
EXPENSES Portfolio Expenses Portfolio Expenses Portfolio Expenses 
Admininstration 21 57 16 50 13 46 
Depreciation 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Other costs 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Provision 4 10 3 8 5 16 
Total Operating 26 68 19 59 18 64 
Expenses 
Financial 12 32 14 41 10 36 
Expenses 
TOTAL 
EXPENSES 37 100 33 100 28 100 i 
NET INCOME 23 20 15 
Table II.8. ADEMI: Analysis of Unadjusted Arrears, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
% of %of % of 
ARREARS Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio 
1-30 days 3,141 4 4,184 3 5,432 3 
31-60 days 1,356 2 2,069 1 2,764 1 
61-90 days 818 1 1,145 1 1,800 1 
More than 90 days 1,967 2 3,023 2 9,264 5 
Total 7,282 8 10,421 7 19,260 10 
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Table 11.9. ADEMI: Loan Collection and Unadjusted Provisions For Bad Loans, 1992-
1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
LOAN COLLECTIONS 
Total due in year 141,279 197,703 240,137 
Losses 2,833 2,761 8,072 
Recuperation (%) 98 99 97 
PORTFOLIO RISK COVERAGE (%) 
Arrears/Portfolio 6 5 5 
Reserve/Portfolio 3 3 4 
Losses/Total disbursed 2 1 2 
Provision/Total disbursed 2 1 2 
B. ADEPE 
Background notes on operational policies and contract terms and conditions are followed 
by tables with financial information and clarification comments. 
ADEPE was founded in 1975 in Moca. Its loan officers are university graduates in eco-
nomics. 
Two sets of figures are presented here for 1994. One includes ADEPE's lending activities 
along with its other non-financial operations, whereas the other one represents the financial results 
of ADEPE's lending activities only. The data did not permit a similar breakdown for 1992 and 
1993. 
The hog and poultry fann lost DR$850,000 in 1994, a loss equal to about half of the profit 
generated by the lending operation. In addition, in 1994 ADEPE received substantial donations 
to undertake a reforestation project. This showed up as donation income for the total operation 
but not for its lending arm. 
The analysis uses figures obtained from FondoMicro. The figures match the audited figures 
presented by ADEPE in its financial statements for 1992 and 1993. The data on the sectoral 
distribution of the portfolio are as of September, 1994. 
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Table 11.10. ADEPE: Adjusted Financial Statements, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994a 
ASSETS 
Cash and deposits 722 320 1,380 
Loan portfolio 4,755 5,189 5,641 
(Reserve for bad loans) (187) (223) (219) 
Fixed assets (net) 1,138 954 964 
Other assets 625 767 1,113 
Total Assets 7053 7,594 8,880 
LIABILITIES 
Loans 3,345 3,153 4,219 
Deposits 0 0 
Other liabilities 1,400 1,754 1,259 
Total Liabilities 4,745 4,907 5,477 
EQUITY 
Capitalized earnings 2,924 2,265 (163) 
Accumulated earnings (616) (164) 3,565 
Total Equity 2,308 3,201 2,263 
Total Liabilities and Equity 7,053 7,007 8,880 
INCOME 
Credit income 908 1,308 1,714 
Donation income 695 537 4,011 
Other income 927 1,908 1,884 
Total Income 2,530 3,753 7,610 
EXPENSES 
Administration 1,173 1,264 1,021 
Provisions 1,070 673 771 
Depreciation 199 167 201 
Other expenses 678 1,793 1,907 
Total Operating Costs 3,120 3,897 3,901 
Financial Costs 26 20 144 
Total expenses 3,146 3,918 4,045 
NET INCOME (616) (64) 3,565 
Notes: a Figures are consolidated and include both lending and non-lending operations. 
b To the extent possible, figures exclude non-lending operations. 
1994b 
399 
6,276 
(70) 
978 
700 
8,283 
3,595 
0 
1,427 
5,022 
2,426 
834 
3,260 
8,283 
1,188 
381 
1,031 
2,600 
647 
142 
47 
858 
1,693 
72 
1,766 
834 
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It is important to reiterate that the balance sheet and all other figures, except for the 
calculation of the SDI and the DLR for 1994 and those tables concerned only with aspects of the 
lending program, include the financial results for many and diverse projects which ADEPE 
pursues apart from its lending. Figures for the lending arm are provided for 1994 only in Table 
H.lO. Thus, ADEPE's overall statement of profits and losses shows a net income of 3,565 for 
1994, whereas the profit figure appearing in the calculation of the SDI is 834. This is because the 
SDI was calculated using the costs and revenues for the lending program apart from ADEPE's 
other activities. This separation of accounts was not possible in 1992 and 1993, explaining why 
no SDI nor DLR figures are presented for those years, as shown in Tables II.ll and II.12. 
In addition, in 1994 it was possible to eliminate some accounts from the balance sheet that 
obviously had no connection with ADEPE's lending program. For example, the reforestation 
project with USAID had its own cash account, own administrative expense account, and the like 
and these were eliminated when possible from both sides of the balance sheet. Such eliminations 
could not be made due to data limitations for the years prior to 1994. 
Some general expense accounts were not separated by project. In these cases, the 
proportion of overall administrative expenses that were assigned to the administration of the 
lending program by ADEPE itself was used to assign a proportion of the undifferentiated expense 
accounts to the lending program. 19 All donations that could not easily be attributed to other 
projects were assigned to the credit program. 
The interest rate charged on loans depends on the ostensible source of those funds from 
the various donors which subsidize ADEPE. For example, micro loans with FondoMicro funds 
have a yearly nominal interest rate of 32 percent, or 2.67 percent per month, with a four percent 
fee paid up front. Loans to agriculture with IDB funds carry an annual interest rate of 44 percent. 
Micro loans from IDB funds carry a six percent fee and an annual nominal rate of 26 percent. 
Arrears in agriculture were 26 percent of the agricultural portfolio outstanding, while loans 
to microenterprises had an arrears rate of 10 percent. FondoMicro agreed to lend to ADEPE only 
if it raised its levels of provisions to the larger of three percent of the portfolio or 50 percent of 
arrears 90 to 180 days old plus 100 percent of arrears older than that. FondoMicro reports 
indicate that more than half of the total portfolio had one or more payments in arrears. This figure 
was reduced to 30 percent by April of 1994, through the insistence and assistance of FondoMicro. 
19 A similar technique was used to assign some portion of the institution's equity to the 
lending program, in order to calculate the SDI for 1994. 
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Table 11.11. ADEPE: Subsidy Dependency Index, 1992-1994. 
1994 
Average annual borrowed funds 3,374a 
Actual financial cost 72 
Shadow financial cost 813 
Implicit subsidy on borrowings 741 
Average annual equity 3,230a 
Actual profits 834 
Shadow return on equity 778 
Implicit subsidy on equity 56 
Other subsidies 381 
TOTAL SUBSIDY 1,178 
Interest actually earned on portfolio 1,188 
SUBSIDY DEPENDENCY INDEX 0.99 
Note: Figures pertain as much as possible to lending operations only. 
a Estimated on the assumption that all borrowed funds in 1993 were for lending and 
that all equity for 1993 resulted from lending profits. This overestimates the 
implicit subsidy. 
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Table U.12. ADEPE: Donor Leverage Ratio, 1992-1994. 
1994 
(1) Total assets less capitalized earnings 5,856 
(2) Loan portfolio 6,276 
(3) Deposits 0 
( 4) Commercial borrowing 0 
(5) Liabilities from the market 0 
(6) Liabilities from donors 5,022 
LEVERAGE OF DONOR LIABILITIES 
Version 1: (1)/(6) 1.17 
Version 2: (2)/(6) 1.25 
Note: Figures pertain to lending operations only. 
Table U.l3. ADEPE: Profitability Analysis (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1994 
Financial income 45 
Financial costs 1 
Gross financial margin 44 
Operating costs 30 
Net operating margin 14 
Imputed capital costs 14 
MARGIN 0 
Required yield on portfolio 45 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of the average annual portfolio and pertain, as much 
as possible, to lending operations only. 
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Table II.14. ADEPE: Balance Sheet Distribution (percentages), 1992-1994. 
ASSETS 
Cash 10 4 16 5 
Loan portfolio (net) 66 73 61 75 
Fixed assets (net) 16 13 11 12 
Other assets 9 10 13 8 
LIABILITIES and EQIDTY 
Loans 46 42 48 43 
Deposits 0 0 0 0 
Other liabilities 19 23 14 17 
Capitalized earnings 37 33 -2 29 
Accumulated earnings -2 3 40 10 
Note: a All figures expressed as percentages of total assets and pertain to all operations. 
b All figures expressed as percentages of total assets and pertain to credit operations only 
Table 11.15. ADEPE: Analysis of Income Structure (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992a 1993a 
% of % of 
%of Total %of Total 
Portfolio Income Portfolio Income 
~redit Income 19 36 25 35 
pther Income 19 37 37 51 
Donations 15 27 10 14 
TOTAL 53 100 72 100 
Note: a Figures pertain to consolidated operations. 
b Figures pertain to lending activities only. 
1994a 1994b 
%of %of 
% of Total % of Total 
Portfolio Income Portfolio Income 
32 23 20 46 
35 25 17 40 
74 53 6 15 
141 100 44 100 
i 
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Table II.15. ADEPE: Analysis of Operational Cost Structure (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992" 1993• 1994• 1994b 
%of % of % of % of 
%of Total %of Total % of Total %of Total 
EXPENSES Portfolio Expenses Portfoho Expenses Portfolio Expenses Portfolio Expenses 
!Administration 25 37 25 34 19 25 11 37 
Depreciation 4 6 3 4 4 5 1 3 
Other costs 4 22 36 46 35 47 14 49 
!Provision 22 34 14 17 14 19 2 8 
!Operating 65 99 78 99 72 96 29 96 
Expenses 
Financial 1 1 0 1 3 4 1 4 
Expenses 
rroTAL 66 100 79 100 75 100 30 100 
EXPENSES 
!NET -13 -3 66 14 
INCOME 
Note: Figures pertain to consolidated operations 
Table H.17. ADEPE: Analysis of Unadjusted Arrears, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
%of % of %of 
ARREARS Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio 
1-30 days 21 0 34 0 275 4 
31-60 days 23 0 18 0 109 2 
61-90 days 12 0 8 0 55 1 
More than 90 days 194 4 86 2 197 3 
Total 250 5 146 3 636 9 
54 
Table II.18. ADEPE: Loan Collection and Unadjusted Provisions fo:r Bad Loans, 1992-
1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
LOAN COLLECTIONS 
Total due in year N/C 5,201 8,914 
Losses 729 310 97 
Recuperation (%) N/C 94 99 
PORTFOLIO RISK COVERAGE (%) 
Arrears/Portfolio 1 1 6 
Reserve/Portfolio 0 0 0 
Losses/Total disbursed N/C 5 1 
Provision/Total disbursed N/C 0 0 
C. ADOPEM 
This section presents background information on operations and contract terms. Following 
the balance sheet are general notes concerning the analysis. 
ADOPEM was founded in 1982. It is a member of the Women's World Banking network, 
and it lends only to women. There is one central office in Santo Domingo and a branch in 
Santiago. The founder's daughter, who has studied fmance in Japan and given instruction to an 
institution similar to ADOPEM in South Africa, is now the executive director. 
ADOPEM's loan portfolio grew at the extraordinary rate of 62 percent per year in real 
terms, between 1992 and 1994. This last year it represented 80 percent of total assets. The 
organization's equity grew 43 percent per year in real terms. 
All of the loan officers are university graduates with degrees related to business, and most 
are culled from a large internship program. The loan officers must grow their portfolios by 10 
percent every month, and after a portfolio reaches a certain size, it must be divided with a new 
loan officer in amoeba fashion. 
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Table II.19. ADOPEM: Adjusted Financial Statements, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
ASSETS 
Cash and deposits 595 1,902 1,536 
Loan portfolio 8,418 16,270 22,145 
(Reserve for bad loans) (187) (223) (219) 
Fixed assets (net) 502 2,111 2,419 
Other assets 1,079 1,158 1,649 
Total assets 12,399.00 21,219 27,530 
LIABILITIES 
Loans 4,732 12,699 16,163 
Deposits 200 601 696 
Other liabilities 2,810 4,364 5,205 
Total liabilities 7,742 17,664 22,064 
EQUITY 
Capitalized earnings 2,723 2,841 3,967 
Accumulated earnings (58) 714 1,499 
Total equity 2,665 3,555 5,466 
Total liabilities and equity 10,407 21,219 27,530 
INCOME 
Credit income 2,928 4,893 6,838 
Donation income 55 967 1,110 
Other income 72 455 141 
Total income 3,055 6,315 8,089 
EXPENSES 
Administration 1,904 2,965 3,792 
Provisions 447 390 680 
Depreciation 95 107 161 
Other Expenses 55 586 301 
Total operating costs 2,501 4,048 4,934 
Financial costs 612 1,553 1,657 
Total expenses 3,113 5,600 6,590 
NET INCOME (58) 714 1,499 
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The figures used in this report are from unaudited statements provided by ADOPEM for 
1994 and from audited statements provided by FondoMicro for 1992 and 1993. Adjustments for 
loan-loss reserves and provisions for 1994 that were suggested by FondoMicro were also used to 
help adjust the figures for that year. The accounts kept by FondoMicro for 1992 and 1993 contain 
adjustments to the capital account that probably require to make the balance sheets from 
consecutive years tie together. Arrears for 1992 were not aged. Writing them off in that year 
would have penalized 1992 disproportionately and thus only half of that amount was written off 
in the adjusted figures, with any balance that made it to 1993 being written off in that year. 
ADOPEM has and has had several loans from commercial banks, but they all have been 
backed with guarantees from donors. The one commercial loan that is unbacked by a donor 
guarantee is a mortgage loan with their locale as collateral. 
ADOPEM offers several types of loans. Solidarity-group loans range from DR$400 to 
DR$6,000, carry terms of four to eight months, and charge an interest rate of three percent per 
month over the initial loan amount. There are no fees with the loans through groups. Micro loans 
range from DR$1,000 to DR$200,000. The terms vary from six to 24 months, the monthly 
interest charge is 2.5 percent. Borrowers must put up a two percent fee up front, along with a two 
percent fee for the provision of training, and six percent for membership fees and compensating 
balances. These balances earn six percent annual interest and may be withdrawn by the borrower 
when the loan has been paid in full, but even then there is a three-month mandatory delay between 
the request for withdrawal and the actual disbursement. Loans from IDB funds are supposed to 
go only to women whose income does not exceed DR$12,558 per household member. 
ADOPEM has developed a savings instrument called the SAM, a play on the Dominican 
word san, the name of a type of informal rotating savings instrument (ROSCA). At ADOPEM, 
women commit to depositing a set amount of money at set intervals of time. After a certain 
number of deposits, the women receive their deposits back, without interest. There is a substantial 
penalty for early withdrawal or for missing a scheduled deposit. While an interesting attempt to 
build on a thriving informal financial phenomenon, clients have not flocked to use it. This is not 
surprising (although ADOPEM's staff were surprised), given the implicit negative return on the 
deposit. In the san, on the other hand, those with early drawings get the hole pot (loan) at no 
explicit interest. 
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Table ll.20. ADOPEM: Subsidy Dependency Index, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
Average annual borrowed funds 3,271 8,716 14,431 
Actual financial cost 612 1,553 1,657 
Shadow financial cost 801 2,157 3,478 
Implicit subsidy on borrowings 189 604 1,821 
Average annual equity 2,713 3,110 4,510 
Actual profits (58) 714 1,499 
Shadow return on equity 668 770 1,087 
Implicit subsidy on equity 726 56 -412 
Other subsidies 55 967 1,110 
TOTAL SUBSIDY 970 1,627 2,519 
Interest actually earned on portfolio 2,928 4,893 6,838 
SUBSIDY DEPENDENCY INDEX I 0.33 0.33 0.371 
Table ll.21. ADOPEM: Donor Leverage Ratio, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
(1) Total assets less capitalized earnings 7,684 18,378 23,563 
(2) Loan portfolio 8,418 16,270 22,145 
(3) Deposits 200 601 696 
(4) Commercial Borrowing 0 0 995 
(5) Liabilities from the market 200 601 1,691 
(6) Liabilities from donors 7,542 17,063 20,373 
LEVERAGE OF DONOR FUNDS: 
Version I: (1)/(6) 1.02 1.08 1.16 
Version II: (2)/(6) 1.12 0.95 1.09 
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Table ll.22. ADOPEM: Profitability Analysis (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
Financial mcome 45 51 42 
Financial costs 9 13 9 
Gross financial margin 36 39 33 
Operatmg costs 37 33 26 
Net operating margin -1 6 8 
Imputed capital costs 13 11 15 
MARGIN -14 -5 -7 
Required yield on portfolio 59 57 49 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of the average annual portfolio. 
Table ll.23. ADOPEM: Balance Sheet Distribution (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 1 1994 
ASSETS 
Cash 6 9 6 
Loan portfolio (net) 79 76 80 
Fixed assets (net) 5 10 9 
Other assets 10 5 6 
LIABILITIES and EQUITY 
Loans 45 60 59 
Deposits 2 3 3 
Other liabilities 27 21 19 
Capitalized earnings 26 13 14 
Accumulated earnings -1 3 5 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of total assets. 
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Table ll.24. ADOPEM: Analysis of Income Structure (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
%of % of %of 
%of Total %of Total %of Total 
Portfolio Income Portfolio Income Portfolio Income 
Credit income 43 96 40 77 36 85 
Other income 1 2 4 7 1 2 
Donations 1 2 8 15 6 14 
TOTAL 45 100 51 100 42 100 
Table ll.25. ADOPEM: Analysis of Operational Cost Structure, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
%of %of Total %of %of Total %of %of Total 
EXPENSES Portfolio Expenses Portfolio Expenses Portfolio Expenses 
Administration 28 61 24 53 20 58 
Depreciation 1 3 1 2 1 2 
Other costs 1 2 5 10 2 5 
Provision 7 14 3 7 4 10 
Operating Expenses 37 80 33 72 26 75 
Financial Expenses 9 20 13 28 9 25 
TOTAL EXPENSES 46 100 45 100 34 100 
NET INCOME -1 6 8 
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Table 11.26. ADOPEM: Analysis of Unadjusted Arrears, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
% of % of % of 
ARREARS Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio 
1-30 days 0 0 306 2 419 2 
31-60 days 0 0 192 1 330 1 
61-90 days 300 4 133 1 266 1 
More than 90 days 311 5 544 4 1,202 5 
Total 611 9 1,175 9 2,217 10 
Table II.27. ADOPEM: Loan Collection and Unadjusted Provisions For Bad Loans, 1992-
1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
LOAN COLLECTIONS 
Total due in year 7,605 13,054 21,342 
Losses 345 359 772 
Recuperation (%) 95 97 96 
PORTFOLIO RISK COVERAGE (%) 
Arrears/Portfolio 4 5 5 
Reserve/Portfolio 3 2 1 
Losses/Total disbursed 3 2 3 
Provision/Total disbursed 1 1 1 
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D. Cooperativa Candelaria 
The cooperative was founded in 1967. The store (colmado) originally associated with the 
cooperative was sold in 1993, and only financial business remains. 
FondoMicro provided data for the cooperative for one year, 1993. The net income reported 
here reflects an adjustment for a large write-off of loans in arrears for more than 90 days. Because 
it was obtained from FondoMicro and not from the cooperative itself, there was less data for 
Cooperativa Candelaria than for the other lenders studied here. It is also the only institution 
studied that was not personally visited by the analysts. 
The membership contributions are technically refundable, but only after 10 years, and so 
the analysis here considers them as paid-in capital. Passbook accounts pay 12 percent on an annual 
basis, twice as much as the large commercial banks pay for similar deposits. Time deposits earn 
16 percent annually. Loans carry an interest charge of four percent per month over the initial 
balance, with a one percent up-front fee. 
A subsidy dependency index was not computed for Coperativa Candelaria. Since it 
essentially does not borrow or receive donor funds, there is no implicit subsidy on borrowings. 
Given its cooperative nature, equity contributions earn implicit returns (not measured here) 
through the interest rate structure on deposits and loans. Donation income is insignificant. The 
cooperative is essentially free from subsidy dependency. 
Similarly, the amount of donor-generated liabilities is minuscule compared to assets and 
the loan portfolio, with the associated high DLR shown in Table II.29. This ratio has to be 
interpreted with caution. 
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Table II.28. Candelaria: Adjusted Financial Statements, 1993. 
1993 
ASSETS 
Cash and Deposits 1,681 
Loan portfolio 3,924 
(Reserve for bad loans) (92) 
Fixed assets (net) 99 
Other assets 86 
Total assets 5,699 
LIABILITIES 
Loans 33 
Deposits 4,019 
Other liabilities 646 
Total liabilities 4,698 
EQIDTY 
Capitalized earnings 925 
Accumulated earnings 77 
Total equity 1,002 
Total liabilities and equity 5,699 
INCOME 
Credit income 1,328 
Donation income 6 
Other income 152 
Total income 1,486 
EXPENSES 
Administration 598 
Provisions 214 
Depreciation 0 
Other Expenses 0 
Total Operating Costs 812 
Financial Costs 598 
Total expenses 1,409 
NET INCOME 77 
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Table 11.29. Candelaria: Donor Leverage Index, 1993. 
1993 
(1) Total assets less capitalized earnings 4,774 
(2) Loan portfolio 3,924 
(3) Deposits 4,665 
( 4) Commercial borrowing 0 
(5) Liabilities from the market 4,665 
(6) Liabilities from donors 33 
LEVERAGE OF DONOR LIABILITIES 
Version 1: (1)/(6) 122.41 
Version 2: (2)/(6) 118.91 
Table 11.30. Candelaria: Profitability Analysis (percentages), 1993. 
1993 
Financial income 38 
Financial costs 15 
Gross financial margin 23 
Operating costs 21 
Net operating margin 2 
Imputed capital costs -12 
MARGIN 14 
Required yield on portfolio 24 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of the average annual portfolio. 
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Table H.31. Candelaria: Balance Sheet Distribution (percentages), 1993. 
1993 
ASSETS 
Cash 29 
Loan portfolio (net) 67 
Fixed assets (net) 2 
Other assets 2 
LIABILITIES and EQUITY 
Loans 1 
Deposits 71 
Other liabilities 11 
Capitalized earnings 16 
Accumulated earnings 1 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of total assets. 
Table H.32. Candelaria: Analysis of Income Structure, 1993. 
1993 
% of Portfolio % of Total Income 
Credit income 43 89 
Other income 5 10 
Donations 0 0 
TOTAL 48 100 
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Table 11.33. Candelaria: Analysis of Operational Cost Structure, 1993. 
1993 
EXPENSES % of Portfolio % of Total Expenses 
Administration 19 42 
Depreciation 0 0 
Other costs 0 0 
Provision 7 15 
Total Operating Expenses 26 58 
Financial Expenses 19 42 
TOTAL EXPENSES 45 100 
NET INCOME 2 
Table II.34. Candelaria: Analysis of Unadjusted Arrears, 1993. 
1993 
ARREARS Amount % of Portfolio 
1-30 days 195 5 
31-60 days 151 4 
61-90 days 74 2 
More than 90 days 105 3 
Total 525 13 
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E. FONDESA 
The analysis of this section uses data obtained from FondoMicro. The amounts match the 
audited figures presented by FONDESA in its financial statements for 1992 and 1993. The 1994 
figures are not audited. In 1993, FONDESA inherited the assets, liabilities, equity, and employees 
of PROAPE, a sister institution which provided training services. PRO APE had positive equity 
at the time, and many of its debts were to the mother institution that it shared with FONDESA 
and which were subsequently forgiven. Thus FONDESA gained from the absorption. 
FONDESA's portfolio grew 17 percent per year in real terms for 1992-1994, less rapidly 
than for the other NGOs. Earnings on its loan portfolio grew only 11 percent per year. This was 
compensated by a sharp reduction in operating expenses, to finally generate profits in 1994. 
FONDESA has several non-financial activities, including training courses for clients and organiz-
ing a marketing fair for clients every year. It also has helped a group of ambulatory vendors 
organize a credit union. 
The data provided by FondoMicro contain an "adjustment" capital account for 1992 and 
1994. The analysis attributes this adjustment to donations, given the unlikelihood that the insti-
tution received no donations in these years, as reported in the data. The original arrears data ap-
peared all lumped into the one-to-30-days category, an unlikely situation, that the authors were 
not able to verify given the institution's past collection history. The adjustment made provisions 
under the assumption that FONDESA's records are accurate. 
At the end of 1993, half of a delinquent portfolio of DR$1.2 million was written off. The 
other half was written off at the end of 1994. Thus, FONDESA has realized a staggering 
sanitization of its portfolio in the past two years. This was part of a strategic plan formulated with 
the help of FondoMicro and whose implementation is required for continued and/or increased 
access to its loans. These write-offs pay for the mistakes of the past today. For example, net 
income in 1994 was reduced by the write-off ofDR$0.6 million, even though only about DR$0.2 
million of new arrears occurred in 1994. As a consequence, FONDESA's equity in 1994 was 
lower than in 1992. 
Loans under DR$50,000 required a fee of eight percent charged in advance and carried 
an annual interest rate of 40 percent over the initial (unmodified) balance. Loans over DR$50,000 
charged an annual interest rate of 38 percent over the initial balance, with a fee of six percent up 
front. Although FONDESA had a portfolio of loans to groups of DR$152,800 outstanding in 
1992, this had decreased to DR$18,863 in 1993. 
It is important to note that although the portfolio and borrowing from FondoMicro grew 
in 1994, FONDESA reduced its borrowings from commercial banks from DR$1.5 million to 
DR$0.4 million. It seems that subsidized funds from FondoMicro substituted for funds from the 
commercial banks previously obtained at market prices (fungibility). 
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Table 11.35. FONDESA: Adjusted Financial Statements, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
ASSETS 
Cash and deposits 561 351 481 
Loan portfolio 3,934 4,611 5,341 
(Reserve for bad loans) (125) (191) (202) 
Fixed assets (net) 201 236 204 
Other assets 124 367 349 
Total Assets 4,696 5,374 6,173 
LIABILITIES 
Loans 3,408 3,575 4,646 
Deposits 0 0 0 
Other liabilities 227 740 620 
Total liabilities 3,635 4,315 5,266 
EQUITY 
Capitalized earnings 1,087 1,239 720 
Accumulated earnings (27) (180) 187 
Total equity 1,060 1,059 907 
Total Liabilities and Equity 4,696 5,374 6,173 
INCOME 
Credit income 2,001 2,251 2,223 
Donation income 0 383 8 
Other income 0 465 221 
Total Income 2,001 3,099 2,452 
EXPENSES 
Administration 1,110 2,089 1,249 
Provisions for bad loans 451 438 383 
Depreciation 81 72 38 
Other expenses 0 0 0 
Total Operating Costs 1,642 2,599 1,671 
Financial costs 386 680 594 
Total Expenses 2,028 3,279 2,265 
NEIINCOME (27) (180) 187 
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Table 11.36. FONDESA: Subsidy Dependency Index, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
Average annual borrowed funds 2,834 3,491 4,110 
Actual financ1al cost 386 680 594 
Shadow financial cost 698 864 991 
Implicit subsidy on borrowings 312 184 396 
Average annual equity 794 1060 983 
Actual profits -27 -180 187 
Shadow return on equity 196 262 237 
Implicit subsidy on equity 223 442 50 
Other subsidies 0 383 8 
TOTAL SUBSIDY 534 1,009 455 
Interest earned on portfolio 2,001 2,251 2,223 
SUBSIDY DEPENDENCY INDEX I 0.27 0.45 o.2o 1 
Table 11.37. FONDESA: Donor Leverage Ratio, 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
(1) Total assets less capitalized earnings 3,608 4,135 5,453 
(2) Loan portfolio 3,934 4,611 5,341 
(3) Deposits 0 0 0 
( 4) Conunercial borrowing 0 0 0 
(5) Liabilities from the market 0 0 0 
(6) Liabilities from donors 3,635 4,315 5,266 
LEVERAGE OF DONOR LIABILITffiS 
Version 1: (1)/(6) 0.99 0.96 1.04 
Version 2: (2)/(6) 1.08 1.07 1.01 
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Table 11.38. FONDESA: Profitability Analysis (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 l 1994 
Financial income 62 73 49 
Financial costs 12 16 12 
Gross financial margin 50 57 37 
Operating costs 51 61 34 
Net operating margin -1 -4 4 
Imputed capital costs 16 10 13 
MARGIN -17 -15 9 
Required yield on portfolio 79 87 58 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of the average annual portfolio. 
Table 11.39. FONDESA: Balance Sheet Distribution (percentages), 1992-1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
ASSETS 
Cash 12 7 8 
Loan portfolio (net) 82 82 83 
Fixed assets (net) 4 4 3 
Other assets 3 7 6 
LIABILIIIES and EQUITY 
Loans 73 67 75 
Deposits 0 0 0 
Other liabilities 5 14 10 
Capitalized earnings 25 23 12 
Accumulated earnings -1 -3 3 
Note: All figures expressed as percentages of total assets. 
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Table II.40. FONDESA: Analysis of Income Structure, 1992-1994 (percentages). 
1992 1993 1994 
% of % ofTotal % of % of Total % of % ofTotal 
Portfolio Income Portfolio Income Portfolio Income 
Credit income 62 100 53 73 45 91 
Other income 0 0 11 15 4 9 
Donations 0 0 9 12 0 0 
TOTAL 62 100 73 100 49 100 
Table II.41. FONDESA: Analysis of Operational Cost Structure, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
% of % ofTotal % of %of Total %of % ofTotal 
EXPENSES Portfolio Expenses Portfolio Expenses Portfolio Expenses 
Administration 35 55 49 64 25 55 
Depreciation 3 4 2 2 1 2 
Other costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Provision 14 22 10 13 8 17 
Total operating 51 81 61 79 34 74 
expenses 
Financial expenses 12 19 16 21 12 26 
TOTAL EXPENSES 63 100 77 100 46 100 
NET INCOME -1 -4 4 
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Table 11.42. FONDESA: Analysis of Unadjusted Arrears, 1992-1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
%of %of %of 
ARREARS Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio Amount Portfolio 
1-30 days 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31-60 days 0 0 0 0 0 0 
61-90 days 0 0 0 0 0 0 
More than 90 days 536 13 1,200 24 674 10 
Total 536 13 1,200 24 674 10 
Table 11.43. FONDESA: Loan Collection and Unadjusted Provisions For Bad Loans, 1992-
1994. 
1992 I 1993 I 1994 
LOAN COLLECTIONS 
Total due in year 2511 4874 N/C 
Losses 281 836 673 
Recuperation (%) 89 83 N/C 
PORTfOLIO RISK COVERAGE(%) 
Arrears/Portfolio 0 0 0 
Reserve/Portfolio 3 7 6 
Losses/Total Disbursed 7 15 N/C 
Provision/Total Disbursed 0 7 N/C 

